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Abstract 
In this “multi-dimensional game” each legal order tries to find its position and to ascend 
in the highest point of the judicial “pyramid”. This Thesis outlines the conceptual 
foundations of an Anti-suit and Anti-arbitration injunction in International Commercial 
Arbitration. It is exhibited the drawing of an anti-suit injunction encountered with the 
international law and stepping further to comity and state’s own sovereignty 
deliberations, evaluating its pragmatic facet and concerns on the enforcement phase, 
accompanied with propositions on alternatives for national courts and counsels. It is also 
submitted the drawing of an anti-arbitration injunction outfaced with international and 
customary law including sovereignty considerations and seeking solutions for curtailing 
the eventual maltreatment adding the tribunal’s confrontation on this command. 
Afterwards, the EU “practice” is analyzed, indicating the justification of the anti-suit 
injunctions’ barring and admissibility through the ECJ’s crucial jurisprudence and the 
preparation for the novel expectancy of Brussels I Recast, scrutinizing its Recital 12. 
Furthermore, both injunctions are captured through the English courts insights and 
inner legislation, demonstrating the pivotal preconditions of their issuance, detecting 
further the repercussions of the Brexit’s Referendum on their application and 
decomposing the British’s persona. They are also placed in the Greek legal reality 
contesting interim measures and greek public policy speculations. This Thesis results 
with an application on the symbiotic relationship between national courts and arbitral 
tribunals and dictates the properness of the injunctions in international commercial 
arbitration and the predominance in each jurisdiction, detecting recent developments 
in the judicial sphere.  
 
Keywords: anti-suit injunctions, anti-arbitration injunctions, procedural pleas, 
international arbitration, Brussels regime 
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Preface 
    This dissertation was written as part of the LLM in Transnational and European 
Commercial Law, Mediation, Arbitration and Energy Law at the International Hellenic 
University. I craved to deepen my knowledge in the field of international commercial 
arbitration and, principally, in the further assessment of jurisdictional and procedural 
matters in an international extent in order to detect the attitudes in both legal forums, 
a civil law and common law jurisdiction and their eventual impact in the nucleus of 
international commercial arbitration. Anti-suit and Anti-arbitration injunctions and their 
exponentially increased employment in the international arbitration arena were the 
appropriate utensils to labor this task and to evaluate their effectiveness via a 
theoretical and intra-court background. 
    The main difficulty that I coped in the course of my research was that I had to consider 
the judgements and standpoints of both national courts and arbitral tribunals in 
conjunction with the experiences, views and feelings of judges, arbitrators and parties 
of various nationalities, in order to base my scientific analysis. This was what exactly I 
wanted to gain from my thesis’s journey. Anti-suit v. Anti-arbitration injunctions: it 
seems that everyone desires to be part of this “legal debate” and so am I. I wanted to 
offer a complete picture for each practitioner in order to be sufficiently informed and 
be confident to answer in this inquiry.  
    Certainly, I would like to express my gratefulness to my Thesis supervisor Prof. Dr. em. 
Athanassios Kaissis for his ardent support and encouragement during my research 
responding to all my concerns; and I owe him my inspiration to entry into the 
international commercial arbitration arena. I would like also to thank all the LLM Faculty 
for their excellent cooperation and willingness to assist in my educational effort.
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INTRODUCTION 
    Are you a dreamer? Which are your Dreams? Do you have a vision about 
international commercial arbitration? It is said that the great aspiration and “dream” 
for international commercial arbitration is to be solidified and duly piloted by the 
internationally established practices, far from the commands of “parochial” national 
laws. There should be no intricacy by national jurisdiction or, at least as little as viable 
can be, for the arbitration agreements and awards to be truly recognized and enforced 
respectively. Accordingly, the “nightmare” script is colonized in cases where national 
law affords a slender right of ingress in the international arbitration arena, interposing 
in the arbitral procedure or re-appraising the resolutions of an international arbitral 
tribunal.1 The “dream” is captured in the conceptual scheme of the “anti-suit 
injunctions”, while the “nightmare” is hanged on the concoction plan of the “anti-
arbitration” injunctions. 
    In this Thesis it will be outlined the concepts of an anti-suit (Chapter I) and anti-
arbitration injunction (Chapter II) in international commercial arbitration, being 
assessed through the doctrinal legal reflections as to exhibit the contrastive stances 
towards their conformity and effectiveness, escorted with propositions on 
alternatives. Ex post, it is imperative to stride into the EU “practice”, indicating the 
justification of their prohibition and admissibility via the ECJ’s semantic jurisprudence 
and the up-to-date Brussels I Recast, reviewing its Recital 12 (Chapter III). 
Furthermore, the anti-suit and anti-arbitration injunctions would be placed in both a 
common and civil law jurisdiction, detecting the English and Greek courts resolutions 
in this regard, and proposing solutions for the post-Brexit’s Referendum day in 
international commercial arbitration (Chapter IV). This Thesis’s aim is to conclude with 
a suggestion on the symbiotic cohabitation between national courts and arbitral 
tribunals, responding on the inquiry which order eventually conquers this “battle” and 
prevails in each above jurisdiction, turning the belief in a self-sufficient nature of 
international commercial arbitration, succeeding its “dream”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
              
    
                                                          
1 Julian D. M. Lew, “Chapter 20: Achieving the Dream: Autonomous Arbitration?”, in Julian D. M. Lew 
and Loukas A. Mistelis (eds), Arbitration Insights: Twenty Years of the Annual Lecture of the School of 
International Arbitration, Sponsored by Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, International Arbitration Law 
Library, Volume 16, Kluwer Law International 2007, pp.455 – 456 
 
2 
 
I. ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 
 
 
A. THE DRAWING OF AN ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTION 
    An anti-suit injunction is a procedural beacon of the jurisdictional apportionment 
method ordaining the intractable litigant resorting to the qualified adjudicator by 
slashing his route to gain access into the unqualified one. Anti-suit injunctions, an 
affrontive form of forum non conveniens2, institute a procedural “device” of common 
law jurisdictions, according to which a national court orders a party to refrain from 
“raising an action before the courts of another forum or, if the party has already 
brought such an action, orders to withdraw from, or to suspend, the foreign 
proceedings”.  In the sphere of international arbitration, the anti-suit injunctions aim 
to impede or intercept a foreign litigation, in violation of an arbitration agreement, 
standing by the side of the arbitral process.3 Specially fabricated to operate merely in 
personam, it endeavors to inhibit a party from initiating or insisting with court 
procedures in an alien jurisdiction, designing a scheme of “extraterritorialité des 
personnes”4.5  
    Detectable from the fifteenth century England, the remedy initially was revealed as 
a “writ of prohibition” by the common law courts to the ecclesiastical ones, preventing 
their diffusive jurisdictional proclamations6. Initially, confined in the allocation of 
jurisdiction among the antagonistic domestic courts, from the early nineteenth 
century, were found competing procedures in Scotland, Ireland and the British 
colonies7. From the Pena Copper Mines Ltd case8 by hindering the performance of a 
                                                          
2 Marco Stacher, “You Don't Want to Go There - Antisuit Injunctions in International Commercial 
Arbitration”, ASA Bulletin, (Association Suisse de l' Arbitrage, Kluwer Law International 2005), Volume 
23 Issue 4, p.644 
 
3 Julian D. M. Lew, “Control of Jurisdiction by Injunctions Issued by National Courts”, in Albert Jan van 
den Berg (ed.), International Arbitration 2006: Back to Basics?, ICCA Congress Series, Volume 13 (Kluwer 
Law International 2007), p.188 
 
4  G. Cuniberti, “Les mesures conservatoires portant sur des biens situés à l'étranger”, L.G.D.J., Paris 
2000, p.112 
 
5 In theory, it is capable that an anti-suit injunction can be addressed against a judge of a state court. 
However in practice this has never placed due to the fact that it would undoubtedly lead to a 
maltreatment of “judicial courtesy”-Nicholas Poon, “The Use and Abuse of Anti-Arbitration Injunctions 
- A Way Forward for Singapore”, 25 SAcLJ 244, 295 (2013), p.247 
 
6 George A. Bermann, “The Use of Anti-Suit Injunctions in International Litigation”, 28 Colum. J. 
Transnat'l L. 589 (1990), p.593 
 
7 Supra n.2, p. 642 
 
8 Pena Copper Mines ltd v Rio Tinto Co Ltd, [1911] 105 LT 846 
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foreign process patronizing an arbitration agreement, it was then that anti-suit 
injunctions were outspread in foreign states within the arbitral coliseum, evolving into 
a worldly-wise status quo.  
    Anti-suit injunctions pursuing to prevent or block court procedures in infringement 
of an arbitration agreement, are more consistent in appearance, with the courts being 
more complaisant to grant these remedies, as their bourn is to enforce the parties’ 
accord. These kinds of concurrent procedures can thwart the progressing or expected 
arbitration guiding to a re-litigation of the idem subject matter that has already 
determined and become res judicata. A decision issued may, additionally, obstruct the 
final enforcement of the tribunal’s award if its deliberations are antithetical in signs 
with the award.9 This exact stance was supported by the English courts in the Aggeliki 
Charis Compania Maritima v. Pagnan case (“The Angelic Grace”)10, which was signified 
as the prototype case for the pertinent granting of an anti-injunction. The Court of 
Appeal contended that in the event, where an injunction pursues to refrain a party 
from processing in an alien court, in disrespect of an arbitration agreement, English 
courts would not bear any compunction in supplying the injunction with the 
justification that “in either case without it the plaintiff will be deprived of its 
contractual rights in a situation in which damages are manifestly an inadequate 
remedy”. Thus, the Court of Appeal elucidated that regarding the enforcement of the 
arbitration agreements, anti-suit injunctions should be issued more effortlessly than 
those concerning injunctions in a foreign process and are grounded on forum non 
conveniens considerations11. As Millet LJ has debunked this “ritual incantation” that 
this is a jurisdiction that should be employed circumspectly, he denies admitting that 
any court would be afflicted by the issuance of an anti-suit injunction to inhibit a party 
from evoking a jurisdiction which betrothed not to bring, being the former’s obligation 
to repulse. He observed that in a collation between an injunction to inhibit actions in 
violation of an arbitration clause and one in violation of an exclusive jurisdiction 
clause, as was the issue in Continental Bank NA v Aeakos Compania Naviera SA case12, 
there is not a variation and should be treated in equal terms.13  
    Borrowing from the U.S. Circuits conceptions the rapprochement of this judgement 
was labelled as a “lax or liberal” one, which is more eager in granting international 
                                                          
9 Stefan Michael Kröll, Julian D. M. Lew, Loukas A. Mistelis, “Chapter 15: Arbitration and the Courts”, in 
Julian D. M. Lew, Loukas A. Mistelis, et al., Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, (Kluwer 
Law International 2003), p.364 
 
10 Aggeliki Charis Compania Maritima S.A. v. Pagnan S.p.A. [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 87,96 
 
11 Supra n.9, p.365 
 
12 Continental Bank NA v Aeakos Compania Naviera SA and Others [1994] 1 WLR 588, para.26 
 
13 Supra n.3, p.202 
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anti-suit injunctions. Such orders are well-fitted when there is a duplication of parties 
and subject matters, emphasizing in certain key-lineaments such as the harassment, 
expense, delay, excruciating inconvenience and diverging decisions procreated from the 
alien action14.15 Although in the posterior jurisprudence of the national courts this 
method has been more attentive, the judgement on the Angelic Grace case has 
steadily been corroborated.   
 
  
B. DOCTRINAL LEGAL REFLECTIONS ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF ANTI-SUIT 
INJUNCTIONS 
 
i) Conformity with International law 
    The NYC does not expressly include a ruling concerning the compatibility of anti-suit 
injunctions in the context of arbitration. However, the sole shortage of an explicit 
article, is not appearing as an adequate rationale for pleading the conformity or 
inconsistency with the Convention. What is expressly identified by the NYC16 is that, 
under the auspices of the formulaic definition in Article II(1)17 of the NYC, an 
arbitration agreement imbues the arbitral tribunal with the authority to rule upon the 
delegated disputes, building in the same time a concurrent judicial order for the 
distribution of justice and the further recognition of this accord by each signatory-
state. In this idem provision inhabits the ism that an arbitration agreement is escorted 
by contractual side effects. The positive side effect is interpreted as a sui generis duty, 
                                                          
14 Under a more confined viewpoint, it is confessed that there can be a simultaneous progress of two 
different procedures, without meditating issues deduced from the lis pendens and forum non 
convenience principles; the decisive matters are met in the case where the foreign act either 
jeopardizes directly the jurisdiction of the forum court, or menaces a robust national policy. The third 
viewpoint discards the preceding appraisals; it declares that the “gatekeeping” process is merely 
whether the issue that concurrent suits concern the idem parties and subject matters, and only if this 
term is accomplished, should the court come in the position to assess the facts, determining the aptness 
of the injunction. If, after checking all the circumstances, comprising also the principal of international 
comity, the court may result that a fair reasoning predominates in the approval of the relief, and then 
might order an anti-suit injunction. - José I. Astigarraga, “Comments on Control of Jurisdiction by 
Injunctions Issued by National Courts”, in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed.), International Arbitration 2006: 
Back to Basics?, ICCA Congress Series, Volume 13 (Kluwer Law International 2007), pp.222-223 
 
15 Arif Ali, Katherine Nesbitt and Jane Wessel, “Anti-suit injunctions in support of international 
arbitration in the US and the UK”, (2008) Int. A.L.R, Issue 1, Sweet and Maxwell and Contributors, p.14  
 
16 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958 (“NYC”) 
 
17Article II(1), “Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under which the parties 
undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which may arise between 
them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter 
capable of settlement by arbitration.” 
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to be actively involved in the arbitral process in “good faith”, which is further 
expanded in the collaborating participation in the entire process by authentically 
propelling its even performance, adhering the reciprocally canonized procedure. 
Tossing the penny, the adverse negative duty finds the contracted parties ipso facto 
committed not to resort to litigation through the commencement of which the 
anticipated boons of a high-speed and effective resolution of the dispute would be 
rebutted. The NYC in its Article II(3)18 sets that when a state courts seized in a matter 
in respect of which the parties have made an arbitration agreement “shall refer the 
parties to arbitration” unless it concludes that the vindicated agreement is voidable.19  
    So, it is heartfelt that, there is no accessible remedy furnishing this exact 
enforcement by way of directly compelling the parties to arbitration, with remarkably 
exceptional records, such as the 4, 206 and 303 of the FAA20 in the US.21 Hence, the 
institutional aid for the achievement of this demand, in the context of real efficacy, is 
found among a suspension or a halt of the suit in each instance, and even this is 
doubtful in a non-arbitration-friendly forum: the court would not order the parties to 
arbitration “sua sponte or ex officio”22. But this situation does not strike against the 
ill-treatment of the entire process, a system where parallel proceedings are not 
ostracized, permitting the pre-arbitration ones in more than one signatory-forum23. 
Therefore, it has been a flaming urgency in founding a more effectual antidote, and 
this is what exactly embodies an unregistered obstructionist order, the anti-suit 
injunction. The ratio for issuing an anti-injunction is inhabited in the defendant’s 
engagement not to initiate foreign court proceedings in breach of the arbitration 
agreement24. A party attempting to prevaricate a potential deleterious arbitral award, 
                                                          
18 Article II(3), “The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect of which 
the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of this article, shall, at the request of one of 
the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void, 
inoperative or incapable of being performed.” 
 
19 Gary B. Born, “Chapter 8: Effects and Enforcement of International Arbitration Agreements”, in 
International Commercial Arbitration, 2nd edition (Kluwer Law International 2014), pp. 1253-1255, 
1258 
 
20 Section 4, Failure to arbitrate under agreement; petition to United States court having jurisdiction 
for order to compel arbitration; notice and service thereof; hearing and 
determination - Section 206, Order to compel arbitration; appointment of arbitrators - Section 303, 
Order to compel arbitration; appointment of arbitrators; locale 
 
21 Julian D. M. Lew, “Does National Court Involvement Undermine the International Arbitration 
Process”, 24 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 489 (2009), pp.527-528 
 
22 Supra n.19, pp. 1263-1264, 1269, 1282 
 
23 Supra n.2, p. 647 
 
24 predestinated to suspend coeval court procedures in a foreign country. 
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or a decision may seek for resolution on the merits in a propitious forum (usually its 
own place of residence), which would probably render a decision favoring him, 
entrapping the adverse party in an onerous position by pleading a court with an 
incompetent jurisdiction, exposed to the detriments of immoderate delay, cost and 
inconvenience. The order’s objective is to contain the claimant in the alien 
proceedings from placing the other party through this tribulation of a falsely 
commenced bulk of proceedings.25  
 
 
ii) The Pragmatic facet and Enforcement of Anti-suit injunctions 
    The rudimental effectiveness of the anti-suit injunction device is that it institutes a 
debarment inflicted by a court not simply dictating, but coercing the party brought 
before an alien court, meaning that if the defendant trespasses the content of the 
injunction would be accountable of “contempt of court, imprisoned, fined or his 
property seized”. The disobedience would supplementary result to the effect that any 
decision acquired by the defendant from the alien forum may not be enforced.26 
Hence, in the international commercial arbitration arena, anti-suit injunctions should 
be perceived as an invaluable attendant of arbitration agreements, reprobated to 
drop into a subversion and ignominy ocean, being totally divested by its initial 
attainments.  
    Nevertheless, the enforcement phase of an anti-suit injunction is said that obscures 
certain imperfections; it is not contingent on the cause on which the injunction is 
grounded, but on the austerity of punishment or the effective locality and access to 
the refractory party’s property. Sensing this functionalism, it is not for the party to 
exhibit optimum basis for the granting of an anti-suit injunction, which will perforce 
flourish, but operable matters such as the carver of the sanctions or the placement of 
the breaching party’s assets are preponderated.27 An extra requisition for the 
injunction to be successful is that the party and its possessions must be instated within 
the area of the national court’s jurisdiction, which is going to enforce the sanction. If 
this condition is not met the indifference for the injunction would stay innocuous, and 
court process will continue to proceed, albeit the existence of the arbitration 
                                                          
25 Chukwudi Paschal Ojiegbe, “From West Tankers to Gazprom: anti-suit injunctions, arbitral anti-suit 
orders and the Brussels I Recast”, Journal of Private International Law, 2015 Vol. 11, No. 2, pp.272-273 
 
26 Ibid n.25, p.292 
 
27 Nadja Erk-Kubat, “Chapter 3: Jurisdictional Pleas and Actions with Parallel Proceedings before an 
Arbitral Tribunal and a National Court”, in Parallel Proceedings in International Arbitration: A 
Comparative European Perspective, International Arbitration Law Library, Volume 30 (Kluwer Law 
International 2014), p.128 
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agreement. Even so, the judgement resulted from such a process will not be 
recognized in the country which had granted the anti-suit injunction at issue.28  
 
 
iii) Comity and Resistance of state’s own Sovereignty 
    At a first glance, the majority would greet this kind of injunction, underpinned that 
such measures strengthen and perfectly boosts the “pro-arbitration” approach: anti-
suit injunctions in assistance of arbitration have a different tenor, to defend the 
parties’ consensus to arbitrate. The parties have determined to resolve their dispute 
under the aegis of a specified mechanism which the courts strive to support by 
stunting a party from trying to evade its engagement to arbitrate.29  
    However, the rising tendency on the part of the merciless parties in international 
arbitration to develop riotous tactics towards the national courts has created an 
increasing disinclination and mistrust. A second glance can guide us to an entirely 
adverse verdict; the image is not as clear and plain as it seems, it creates an illusory 
effect. There is an extended atmosphere in the arbitration field that this is another 
additional step, showing the path to the court intervention, in something that is 
alleged to be a private law, a non-court procedure: it is the “fine line of a novel and 
perilous block”. It is enshrined in the conceptual idea of arbitration that court 
intervention of any type is completely incompatible, except for the enforcement stage 
and certain individual instances that is needed.30 However, it is true that every remedy 
has its own price. 
    An anti-suit injunction is visualized as an irrational penetration by a national judge 
in the legal culture of another jurisdiction. Though anti-suit injunctions are not issued 
against an alien court, but to one of the litigants in dispute, it is manifest that they are 
planned to safeguard the forum’s competence, which in the view of the court 
addressing the injunction, overcomes the competence of another jurisdiction, and 
thereof intrinsically stripping its inborn right to be the master of its own jurisdiction, 
                                                          
28 Jose Carlos Fernandez Rozas, “Anti-Suit Injunctions Issued by National Courts: Measures Addressed 
to the Parties or to the Arbitrators”, in Anti-Suit Injunctions in International Arbitration (Emmanuel 
Gaillard ed., 2005), Juris Publishing Inc. and International Arbitration Institute (IAI), p.76 
 
29 Supra n.27, p.125 
  
30 Axel H. Baum, “Anti-suit Injunctions Issued by National Courts To Permit Arbitration Proceedings”, 
in Anti-Suit Injunctions in International Arbitration (Emmanuel Gaillard ed., 2005), Juris Publishing Inc. 
and International Arbitration Institute (IAI), pp.20-21 
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piloting to questions of own state’s sovereignty31, reiterated by the Regional Court of 
Appeal in Düsseldorf in its judgement 11/9532. 
    An interdictory order by a national court such an anti-suit injunction, substantially 
criticizes the ministerial picks of the alien state with respect to the operation of its 
judiciary, concluding to an averment of contravention to public international law and 
comitas gentium33. Concomitantly, an anti-suit injunction de facto pokes one national 
judge hostile to another, cogitating a deficiency of credence by one national 
adjudicator to the other. These pleas are presenting the civil law legal cultivation, 
giving impetus to the public rather than to the private adjudicators34.35   
    In view of sovereignty and comity considerations, anti-suit injunctions can be 
evolved into a defiance and plainly guide the alien forum to shield its sovereignty by 
invoking a germane order, like the materialization of an anti-anti-suit injunction.36 
Imagine the chaos that would be created the moment it evolves into a self-destruction 
tit-for-tat play. An illustrative example of this effect is the famous Pertamina case37. 
In this case a sequence of injunctions by national courts was took place ordering the 
other state’s parties, with the one side of state court attempting to annul the other 
state’s decisions. Like Americans says the parties were troubled “between a rock and 
a hard place”.38 
 
                                                          
31 Toby Landau, “’Arbitral Lifelines’: The Protection of Jurisdiction by Arbitrators”, in Albert Jan van den 
Berg (ed.), International Arbitration 2006: Back to Basics?, ICCA Congress Series, Volume 13 (Kluwer 
Law International 2007), p.285 
 
32 Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf, 10 January 1996 [3 VA 11/95] Re the Enforcement of an English Anti-
Suit Injunction [1997], ILPr 320 
 
33 “courtesy,complacence…a principle in accordance with which the courts in one state or jurisdiction 
will give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another, not as a matter of obligation but out of 
deference and respect”, Buhala - Mauro Rubino-Sammartano, “International Arbitration-Law and 
Practice”,3rd Edition, JurisNet, LLC (2014), p.556 
 
34 Another piece of perturbation is also founded when the anti-suit injunction is sought to the litigants 
before alien fora, furnishing the sentence of a national court with an “extraterritorial” dimension, 
where in another situation there might not be such incurrence. Anti-suit injunctions also tempt 
providence on repulsing a party from its vital and constitutional right of access to justice.- Supra n.31, 
p.285 
 
35 Supra n.27, p.126 
 
36 Supra n.31, p.285 
 
37 Karaha Bodas Company, L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara (“KBC v. 
Pertamina”), 190 F. Supp. 2d 936, United States District Court-S.D.Tex. [2001]  
 
38 Supra n.30, p.21; See also Michael E. Schneider, “Court Actions in Defence Against Anti-Suit 
Injunctions”, in Anti-Suit Injunctions in International Arbitration (Emmanuel Gaillard ed., 2005), Juris 
Publishing Inc. and International Arbitration Institute (IAI), pp.44-46 
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C. THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL’S “DEVOIR” ON GRANTING “ARBITRAL” ANTI-SUIT 
ORDERS 
    This dissension and skepticism emerged from the court-based jurisprudence, have 
straightly pollute the standpoint for anti-suit injunctions in the coliseum of 
international commercial arbitration, and in reality, most arbitrators are being 
reluctant to step in. On the one hand, many have supported that judges must not 
acquire such power and that arbitrators must be restrained uniformly for the identical 
ratios. Others are not willing to capture the instance in which arbitrators may have 
more substantial or dissimilar powers in this respect than the national courts. 
Furthermore, it is voiced that a private tribunal is essentially in a minor judicially 
position than a judge, to meddle in a sovereign court procedure: the concept of 
intervening with a state court has been deemed as being far from the arbitrator’s 
command.39 
    Refuting this argumentative syllogism, international arbitration as chiefly a child of 
contract is liberate from the barriers that the national courts are engaged to propound 
to each other like: the solemn regime of international comity, the vigilant respect of 
their regional and sovereign borders upon their jurisdiction, the vital adherence to the 
principles of forum non convenience and lis pendens as to the allotment of the 
jurisdiction and the performance within a European autonomous system. Of course, 
this does not support the idea that international arbitrators are completely discharged 
to mingle at their volition with national court procedures40, but it recommends that, 
worries illustrated in the court orders should be employed with attention when 
arbitrators “take the reins”.  
    It is confessed that sovereignty demur is confoundedly alleviated where anti-suit 
injunctions are ordered by arbitral tribunals in violation of an arbitration agreement. 
The authority of arbitrators to address anti-suit relief is inducted in a twofold basis: 
the “jurisdiction to sanction all breaches of the arbitration agreement” and “power to 
take any appropriate measures either to avoid the aggravation of the dispute or to 
ensure the effectiveness of their future award”. It is ossified in the arbitral that both 
side effects of the arbitration agreement do not merely fuel the obligation to the 
contracted parties to arbitrate, but it guides a fortiori to the assignment of jurisdiction 
on the arbitral tribunal to determine all the disputes covered by the agreement and 
the incumbent duty to shield it with all the possible modes, containing the granting of 
remedies impersonated in anti-suit injunctions. Arbitrators have the power to punish 
any contractual violation either through an award of damages (“interim award”), or 
by enjoining certain performance (“procedural order”) for reparation. Hence, an anti-
suit injunction is not less than an order addressed by the arbitrators, to the escaping 
                                                          
39 Supra n.31, p.286 
 
40 Supra n.31, p. 287 
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party to be conformed with its contractual commitment to arbitrate the agreed 
disputes and amiss had tendered in the domestic courts.41 Each international tribunal 
is equipped with the coalescent jurisdiction to address anti-suit injunctions as they 
institute the pivotal arbitral “lifelines”, guarding the tidy arranging of the disputes, 
echoed as a “general principle of law” within the nuance of Article 38(1)(c)42 of the 
SICJ43. 
    When it is requested to restrict a party from initiating proceedings before a national 
court, the arbitral tribunals must show a sturdy character to extract any kind of 
worries as to the intervention with a sovereign national procedure, the substantial 
constitutional rules, the national court’s magistracy and the latter’s right to its own 
“competence-competence”44. It has also been doubted that the effectiveness of these 
measures is not productive if granted by arbitrators, and urges to be cogitated before 
boarding on a relevant petition: an arbitral anti-suit order is not per se enforceable, 
forfeiting the compulsive power that courts attain, and such an “astreinte” becomes 
inert without the countenance of enforcement by national courts45. 
 
 
D. SENTENTIOUS MEMOS ON SEARCHING FOR ALTERNATIVES 
    The basic step to a felicitous international dispute management is for the parties 
and their counsels to fabricate the arbitration clause cautiously earning in legal 
predictability, costs and time economy. By corroborating the granting and 
ramifications of anti-suit inunctions internationally, examining closely, in a 
comparative assessment the national arbitration laws, what is applied procedurally, 
containing jurisdiction to order such injunctions and the pertinent referral to 
arbitration, and substantively, checking-twice the preliminary matter of the validity of 
the arbitration agreement or the enforceability of the promise to arbitrate46. A 
                                                          
41 Emmanuel Gaillard, “Anti-suit Injunctions Issued by Arbitrators”, in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed.), 
International Arbitration 2006: Back to Basics?, ICCA Congress Series, Volume 13, (Kluwer Law 
International 2007) pp.237-239 
 
42 Article 38(1)(c), “The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such 
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations” 
 
43 Supra n.31, p. 292 
 
44 Supra n.31, p. 286 
 
45 An “astreinte” institutes the menace of a civil sanction guaranteeing conformity with the judge’s 
decision emanating from the French law. - Supra n.27, pp.225,231 
 
46 As a paradigm, in a dispute where a national court denies postponing the legal procedure by contrast 
to a valid arbitration agreement, defining (in the agreement) that court process can be commenced by 
either of the contracting parties merely after an arbitral award has been issued on the identical subject, 
may be fruitless according to certain arbitration regimes such as the English one. - Guido Carducci, 
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preventative measure, which is indicative to be taken, is the conclusion of the 
arbitration agreement with a clear indication of the governing law, which is usually 
overlooked in the negotiations of the main contract and the dispute settlement 
agreement. Depending solely on the principle of “separability presumption” in order 
to surpass a choice-of-law would be an erroneous movement, since it merely hinders 
the invalidity reliance of the main contract to the arbitration agreement and does not 
settle the law governing the latter47, extruding also from an eventual benefit of “juge 
d’appui”48 opting for the French statute.  
    Lieu in vigorously enforcing an arbitration agreement, national courts can reveal a 
more passive stance, fostering the arbitration agreement impliedly. A court may 
adjourn a harassing lawsuit raised before it, in violation of the agreement as an 
alternative of protruding a party to cease a parallel court procedure or to proceed to 
arbitration. Hence, this indirect mode presses the claimant to resort to arbitration, 
since he will not occupy any judicial forum to hold his declaration.49 A descriptive 
exemplar is the Channel Tunnel case, where Eurotunnel brought a claim in the English 
courts calling for an injunction to restrict Trans-Manche Link from stemming their 
operations, with the latter pleasing for a stay of the procedure on behalf of arbitration. 
The House of Lords dictated to procrastinate the process, resting on the court’s 
intrinsic jurisdiction to perform so in case of an infringement of arbitration.50 It seems 
that this passive support tenders a more secure course to placate the court’s concerns. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
“Validity Of Arbitration Agreements, Court Referral To Arbitration And FAA § 206, Comity, Anti-
Suit Injunctions Worldwide And Their Effects In The E.U. Before And After The New E.U. Regulation 
1215/2012”, Hans Smit and Juris Publishing Inc., The American Review of International Arbitration 
2013, 24 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 515, pp.17-18 
 
47 Ibid n.46, p. 17 
 
48 A judge, who is normally the president of the Tribunal de Grande Instance, intercedes in pitfalls with 
the composition of an arbitral tribunal and in the event of a “denial of justice” to enter into the arbitral 
procedure, sustaining arbitration. – Supra n.33, pp.557-558 
 
49 Supra n.3, pp.205-206 
 
50 Channel Tunnel Group Ltd. v. Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd. [1993] A.C. 334, pp.334-335, 367-368 
(H.L.) 
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   II. ANTI-ARBITRATION INJUNCTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL              
ARBITRATION 
 
A. THE DRAWING OF AN ANTI-ARBITRATION INJUNCTION 
    Anti-arbitration injunctions have been lived in the judicial sphere for a long time, 
surfacing in the late 19th and early 20th century, where the vast authority proposed 
that where a claim in an arbitration was not included in the arbitration agreement, 
the court has not the ability to block it and in this lodgment, an arbitration did not 
result to a breach of a “legal right”.51 Anti-arbitration injunctions’ mission is to impede 
the arbitral process, in order to safeguard the jurisdiction of a State court over a 
specified case. This kind of injunction is manifestly addressed against the arbitration, 
ejecting the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal, and that its name. Analogous to anti-
suit injunctions, anti-arbitration injunctions are applied “in personam”; they can be 
opposed to one of the parties to the arbitration, the arbitral tribunal or a specific 
arbitrator or, additionally, to the arbitral institution.52 Anti-arbitration injunctions 
have two alternative aims: firstly, they endeavor to impeach the performance and 
realization of the arbitral process or secondly, to obstruct the actual enforcement of 
the arbitral awards (“anti-enforcement injunctions”)53.  
    Such injunctions emerge mainly, when the existence or validity of an arbitration 
agreement is called into speculation, albeit this is the guise of the ultimate purpose to 
cease or undermine and weaken the arbitral proceedings. A petitioner who claims that 
it is not liable to the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction can request injunctive relief from 
the national courts to safeguard his right not to participate in the arbitration through 
a declaration. If he meets the prospects of the court that he is not committed by any 
agreement, the latter will have a footing to grant an anti-arbitration injunction54.   
    The triggered issue, here, is if a party having signed an arbitration agreement has a 
reasonable right to take the first step into a court hall, pursuing to impede the 
arbitration process from being commenced, insisting or concluded. In typical terms, a 
party can be fairly justified to utilize an anti-arbitration injunction pleading that it 
would be extremely unjust, inadequate and overpriced to proceed with the 
arbitration, merely to have the award set aside after a long-lasting arbitration process, 
and after to re-insert the claim afresh to the competent national court. The path which 
leads the matter immediately before the qualified national court is pondered to be 
                                                          
51 Supra n.5, p.248 
 
52 Supra n.3, p.188 
 
53 Supra n.27, p.120 
 
54 Supra n.5, pp.247-248 
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reasonable gaining in time and money spent pointlessly, chiefly in the exceptional 
“construction disputes”. It is well admitted that this argument is worthy of 
speculation, but it neglects the essence of international arbitration. However, it is 
essential to seek into each individual preceding case to comprehend whether an anti-
arbitration injunction may be reasoned at any point or whether lawyers are utilizing 
this kind of remedy as an “ace up in their sleeves” to dilute or gravely sabotage an 
arbitration, rather than in the merits of the dispute.55  
 
 
B. DOCTRINAL LEGAL REFLECTIONS ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF ANTI-ARBITRATION 
INJUNCTIONS 
    So, we have to take a step back and consider: are anti-arbitration injunctions 
reasoned at any point? Still in the case where a national law caters the power to its 
courts to order anti- arbitration injunctions, is this practice appropriate anyway? An 
anti-arbitration injunction can hardly ever be justified56. 
 
i) Sovereignty and Conformity with International law 
    In a brief gaze, anti-arbitration injunctions do not attract the same stricture 
amounted to the anti-suit injunctions, owing that they do not directly penetrate the 
jurisdiction of national court’s sovereign status57. Albeit arbitration is subject to a 
judicial regime of a specified jurisdiction by the supporters of the “conventional” idea, 
it is indeed very difficult to be interpreted as a prolongation of a state’s judicial 
apparatus. Hence, objections on the mistreatment of state sovereignty against the 
anti-suit injunctions are not efficient in the field of anti-arbitration injunctions. 
Nevertheless, their legitimacy is suspected, as they present an irreconcilable character 
with the international arbitration law.58  
    When a national court operates in its functions, it operates as a jigger of the state, 
turning the latter in international level liable. When a national court grants an anti-
arbitration injunction, impeding the international arbitration consented in the 
agreement, that is the court that deducts the parties to arbitration as Article II(3) 
commands. It is the identical court, that does not accomplish to recognize an arbitral 
award as binding and enforceable as Article III59 orders, and it declines it, in advance, 
                                                          
55 Supra n.3, pp.189, 215 
 
56 Supra n.3, p.215 
 
57 Supra n.3, p.289 
 
58 Supra n.5, p.247 
 
59 Article III, “Each Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them…There 
shall not be imposed substantially more onerous conditions or higher fees or charges on the recognition 
14 
 
with a ratio, which is not included within the selected borders of Article V of the NYC. 
The parties engaged to a treaty are bound under international law, conforming blindly 
with the Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties, to act in a “good faith”. As the 
Convention states, the party should not recourse to the rules of its internal domestic 
law, declaring it as an alibi for its defection to implement the treaty. The genuine 
intention of the NYC is to guard that arbitration agreements and their arbitral awards, 
as their judicial creatures, are truly recognized and enforced ab initio. It seems that if 
a court grants an anti-arbitration injunction, acting away from recognizing and 
enforcing an arbitration agreement, paralyzes the arbitration process, which 
endeavors to perform this agreement, is incompatible with the duties promised by the 
State on the substance of the NYC, manipulating its pneuma.60 
    The UNCITRAL Model Law61 does not explicitly outfaces with the anti-arbitration 
injunctions, but Article 562 accompanied with the spirit of the enactment, advocates 
bluntly on the forbiddance of these injunctions. It has been indicated that these 
“matters” are encompassing “the assistance” to the arbitral procedure and “the 
control of legality” of the latter. Anti-arbitration injunctions veritably perform as 
auditors to the legitimacy of the arbitral procedure in all circumstances, whether the 
injunction is addressed against the parties or the arbitrators. It hunts to inspect the 
jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal and, hence the legitimacy of the entire arbitral 
procedure. As an outcome, anti-arbitration injunctions should be counted as matters 
falling inside the scope of the provision. Correspondingly, the national courts of a 
Model Law state, should not depend on their inner national law for the issuance of 
anti-arbitration injunctions, principally in a segregation of domestic and international 
arbitration. It is a necessity to be declared that, under Article 1(2) of the Model Law, 
Article 5 solely is in force, if the injunction is addressed by a court of the locus of 
arbitration. The meaning of this fission pilots to the conclusion, that the Model Law 
does not interdict domestic courts from preventing an arbitration abroad. This ceiling 
is misplaced, since the legal certainty cannot be delimited to the intervention from the 
courts of the arbitral situs. However, there is a forceful allegation to load this gap: an 
anti-arbitration injunction trying to impede an arbitration abroad, is adversely 
affecting the regime which the Model Law creates, serving the inquiring of the arbitral 
                                                          
or enforcement of arbitral awards to which this Convention applies than are imposed on the recognition 
or enforcement of domestic arbitral awards.” 
 
60 Stephen M. Schwebel, “Anti-suit Injunctions in International Arbitration-An Overview”, in Anti-
Suit Injunctions in International Arbitration (Emmanuel Gaillard ed., 2005), Juris Publishing Inc. and 
International Arbitration Institute (IAI), p.10 
 
61 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985), with amendments as adopted 
in 2006, United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
 
62 Article 5, “In matters governed by this Law, no court shall intervene except where so provided in this 
Law.” 
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procedure ex post the procurement of the award. This statement was certified in the 
eighteenth assembly of “travaux préparatoires” of the UNCITRAL to reduce the court 
chances to easily pierce into the arbitral process, disincentivizing dilatory strategies. 
Therefore, anti-arbitration injunctions run counter to the non-interventionist regime 
of the Model Law, forbidding national courts to grant anti-arbitration injunctions.63 
 
 
ii) Compliance with Customary international law 
    Moreover, there are principles which must be respected and obeyed under the 
customary international law. As a first situation, it has been long admitted that a state, 
which embargoes a foreign citizen or company to access its national courts, it was 
automatically accused guilty of “denial of justice”. This principle should also be 
applied, when a state declines the entrance to the arbitral proceedings conferred by 
an existing arbitration agreement. This kind of decision should be announced as a 
modus of a State’s abnegation of its commitment to arbitrate. Abiding the words in 
the Benteler case64, when a national court, in the scene of international arbitration, 
stunts the ingress to the arbitration procedure through the granting of an anti-
arbitration injunction, that amounts equally to a “denial of justice”, being 
simultaneously a breach of international public policy65. 
    A second branch of infraction of customary international law is erected in the State’s 
abstention to grasp the property and the contractual rights of a foreign citizen in the 
spectrum of its jurisdiction, maneuvering in an “arbitrary, tortious or confiscatory” 
mode. The contractual right of a party to arbitrate its disputes is valuable, ascending 
frequently as the indispensable part of the closing of the contract at the first place. An 
extra segment of illicitness is found in its contradiction with the cardinal principle of 
the law of contracts, which is generally endorsed as a “source of law” by the Statute 
of the ICJ. This principle is there to ensure that the parties expectations from the 
contract, with its crucial Terms of Reference, are going to be interpretatively decisive 
for the execution of the former. When the parties in an international contract 
determine international arbitration as the sole means of resolving their conflicts, it is 
manifest that the parties’ expectations are conquered by the granting of an anti-
arbitration injunction, striking-out arbitration. In this background the principle of 
“party autonomy” is being at discrepancy with such injunction. In the Salini case66 the 
                                                          
63 Supra n.3, p.198 
 
64 Ad Hoc-Award of November 18, 1983 Benteler v. Belgium, para.184-190, J.Int'l Arb. 1984, pp.230-232 
 
65 Supra n.60, pp.12-13 
 
66 Salini Costruttori S.p.a. v. The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa Water and 
Sewerage Authority, ICC No. 10623/AER/ACS (2001), para.128 
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ICC tribunal opined that, since the parties’ accord was to settle their dispute through 
arbitration, it would overlook the injunction, persisting with arbitration indicated by 
the parties’ agreement.67    
    The last, but not least, basal principle, which is trespassed blatantly is that the 
arbitral tribunal is the sole adjudicator of its own jurisdiction. The spring of this 
authority rolls from the well-established legal fiction68 in international arbitration of 
“competence-competence” (Kompetenz-Kompetenz). In specific, this innate weapon 
is communicated through two dimensions: a positive and a negative one. The positive 
expresses the arbitral tribunal’s power to self-identify its own jurisdiction, while the 
negative one, that the arbitral tribunal should have the precedence in founding 
jurisdiction and the national courts should be prevented to a prima facie inquiry, 
cherishing a prospective assessment after the decision of the tribunal. 
Notwithstanding the universal concord on the positive side of competence-
competence, the negative one stands as the “apple of discord” when reckons on the 
measurement of national court’s curb from meddling in the arbitrators’ jurisdiction.69 
    While the Model Law gears with an explicit recognition the arbitrators’ competence-
competence jointly with a procedural plan on operating its authority (Article 16(1)), 
with any jurisdictional judgement being exposed to a subsequent judicial inspection 
(Article 16(3) and 34(2)(a)), whereas at the same time permitting interlocutory judicial 
speculation on jurisdictional matters ex ante or simultaneously (Article 8(1)), while the 
arbitral process progresses on the same issue (Article 8 (2)), it is perceptible that does 
not furnish a healthy solution. Although, this is an internationally accepted principle, 
the international forum is not mature enough to generate net rules, so its prosecution 
in national arbitration legislations is contingent on the jurisdictions posture towards 
the correlation among national courts and arbitral tribunals.70 Hence, the ball is on 
each state’s terrain to decide, according to the procedural law of the arbitral locus. 
The most progressive paragon of the negative dimension of “competence-
                                                          
67 A fundamental principle of international arbitration which is sacrificed for the granting of an anti-
arbitration injunction, is the so-called “separability presumption”. In the situation where the main 
contract is challenged, the “invalidity, termination, nullification or suspension” of the contract does not 
affect the arbitration commitment for the parties. The arbitration clause is deemed to be completely 
severable from the main contract which it merely forms part. This is a notable remark, because very 
often anti-arbitration injunctions are issued in this allegation, evoking that the main contract is invalid 
or is concluded in circumstances of depravation. Hence, the remedy is not affiliated with the principle 
of the “separability presumption” at any point. – Supra n.60, pp.13-14 
 
68 Stefan Michael Kröll, Julian D. M. Lew, Loukas A. Mistelis, “Chapter 14: Determination of Jurisdiction”, 
in Julian D. M. Lew, Loukas A. Mistelis, et al., Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, 
(Kluwer Law International 2003), p.333 
 
69 Gary B. Born, “Chapter 7: International Arbitration Agreements and Competence-Competence”, in 
International Commercial Arbitration, 2nd edition (Kluwer Law International 2014), pp.1069-1071 
 
70 Ibid n.69, pp.1078-1081 
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competence” is detected in France and Switzerland (Article 186(1bis) of SPILA71), with 
the former, furnishing a clear-cut rule on prioritization of tribunals over courts. 
According to Article 1458 of the revised code of FCCP72, French courts should deny 
jurisdiction over disputes, which are encompassed by an arbitration agreement, 
without examining the merits of the dispute or the validity of the agreement to 
arbitrate, once the dispute being stuck to a prima facie test (“save where the 
arbitration agreement is manifestly null”)73. Whilst the decision on jurisdiction can be 
reviewed by a national court, the latter does not have the power to hinder or obviate 
the materialization of that judgement by the arbitration’s mechanism. Thus, anti-
arbitration injunctions aiming to block the arbitral tribunal’s ex ante power to rule 
upon their own jurisdiction and the mere granting of an injunction grounded on a 
court’s perception on the validity and scope of an arbitration agreement audibly 
“negates the principle of competence-competence”, as Professor Fouchard has 
signified and for this single rationale should be restrained74. 
    These axioms are well-canonized in the field of international arbitration law. They 
may owe their birth in one regime or another, but they are elementary to the 
machinery and operation of international arbitration. These doctrines have been 
evolved into norms of customary international law via their extensive admission and 
codification in the NYC, the UNCITRAL Model Law and in most of the modern 
arbitration statutes.75 
 
 
C. CURTAILING THE POTENTIAL MALVERSATION 
    It is imperative to ponder futile ways to attempt to reverse this cumbersome 
situation for the arbitration process. One measure that can be taken is addressed to 
the tribunal to dictate “cost orders” on the parties of the dispute, being independent 
from the other penalties until the finale of arbitration. This technique can be evolved 
                                                          
71 Article 186(1bis) SPILA, “It shall decide on its jurisdiction notwithstanding an action on the same 
matter between the same parties already pending before a state court or another arbitral tribunal, 
unless there are serious reasons to stay the proceedings.” 
 
72Article 1458 FCCP, “Where a dispute, referred to an arbitration tribunal pursuant to an arbitration 
agreement, is brought before a court of law of the State, the latter must decline jurisdiction. Where the 
case has not yet been brought before arbitration tribunal, the court must also decline jurisdiction  save 
where the arbitration agreement is manifestly null. In both cases, the court may not raise sua sponte its 
lack of jurisdiction.” 
 
73 Supra n.69, pp. 1112-1114 
 
74 Supra n.3, p.216 
 
75 Supra n.3, p.217 
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into a strong device for sanctioning parties de facto, pleading an allegation of this 
precarious quality without having some substance76.  
    It is strenuous to consider cases in which there would stand a vindication for a 
national court to interfere and immobilize arbitration. Although this is not a panacea 
and there would always exist certain exception from this absoluteness. Sadly, these 
cases emerge under the dogma of the natural propensity that national courts are 
there to shield the interests of the parties, despite the parties’ agreement77, and the 
national court should at all costs take care of its own citizens as their sacrosanct duty. 
A contention in this court chauvinism is that the “perfect” settlement should be rested 
to the arbitrators in the second forum to disband the concurrent procedures: a second 
tribunal should be in charge and not a national court78.  
 
 
D. THE “RIPOSTE” OF THE ENJOINED TRIBUNAL 
    Now, how should an arbitrator react when confronted with an injunction from a 
national court, commanding that he individually, or a tribunal in which he participates, 
should postpone its process or discontinue the arbitration? Should the arbitrator 
contemplate his allegiance to the contracting parties and their arbitration agreement 
and set aside its idem private liberty, particularly in cases where the sanction for 
violating a court injunction may be fees or incarceration for contempt of court? The 
first potential is to plainly neglect the injunction, justifying that the court ordering the 
injunction is not the competent one (the court of the situs of arbitration is) and that 
infringes the law and modus operandi of the international arbitration. Taking the risk, 
this would be a valorous maneuver, putting the arbitrator or the tribunal, in an 
onerous condition, especially where any member of the synthesis have to travel to the 
jurisdiction under dispute. Nevertheless, the arbitrators should demonstrate a rightful 
stance, if they have determined to obey their commitment to the parties, according 
to their primordial loyalty, to strive with tenacity in issuing a strong and enforceable 
award. It is advised that the rapprochement for the arbitrators, coping with an anti-
arbitration injunction, will be contingent in a case by case inspection, evaluating the 
repercussions that would afflict the tribunal and each of the parties. The arbitrators 
must ruminate, that an award issued ignoring an injunction, may not be enforceable 
in the state, where its national courts granted the order and should be truly convinced 
                                                          
76 Julian D. M. Lew, “Anti-suit Injunctions Issued by National Courts To Prevent Arbitration Proceedings”, 
in Anti-Suit Injunctions in International Arbitration (Emmanuel Gaillard ed., 2005), Juris Publishing Inc. 
and International Arbitration Institute (IAI), pp.27 
 
77 Ibid n.76, p.39 
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that this action would not imperil the enforceability of the award. But even in this 
storyline, the party have the fortune to search the enforcement of the award in 
another country than the enjoined one.79  
    An illustrative paradigm of this confrontation presented in an ICC case 5294, a 
Danish company and an Egyptian employer came into an agreement for the 
implementation of a cattle abattoir in Egypt, enclosing for an ICC arbitration in Zurich. 
The Egyptian party contested the jurisdiction of the arbitrator, conjuring that the 
arbitration clause was invalid, and thereof the arbitration process should be adjourned 
with the Egyptian courts addressing an anti-arbitration injunction. The sole arbitrator 
disregarded the injunction and oppugned that there was no notification of the 
injunction rightly on his face and irrespectively, “court proceedings in Egypt did not 
and do not have any direct influence on the present arbitration proceedings, since 
Egyptian Courts would not have jurisdiction of either these proceedings or the 
arbitrator80”.81 
    Venturing to reinforce and boost the administration of justice, anti-arbitration 
injunctions ended to have accomplished the exact adverse effect: the manipulation of 
the arbitral process. It is the practical reality that lawyers are searching for ways to 
safeguard their clients concerns more than trying to solve in fact the dispute. In doing 
this flashback, it is easily intelligible that anti-arbitration injunctions are “used and 
abused” in the sake of the obstruction and retardation against arbitration.82  
    Ex post the doctrinal legal reflections of the anti-suit and anti-arbitration 
injunctions, it is imperative to lessen the “theory” and stride into the “practice” 
keeping the eyes in the unremitting happenings of EU’s legal saga.  
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80 Danish firm v Egyptian firm, Final Award, ICC Case No. 5294, 22 February 1988, in Albert Jan van den 
Berg (ed.), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 1989 - Volume XIV, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, 
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III. EUROPEAN UNION AND ANTI-SUIT/ANTI-ARBITRATION INJUNCTIONS 
 
A. “WITH THE EYES” IN THE EU AND THE BRUSSELS REGIME 
    A law student of European chronicles studies a Europe “disunited”. From Spain and 
England struggling for predominance over the seas to France and Germany’s never-
ending ground battles, Europe’s tale is a belligerent one, with states widely shielding 
their own land, dialect, habits and perceptions. But with the advent of the devastation 
that the second World War created, a “brand new” Europe endeavors for the profits 
of a better coordination and slighter quarrelling. A progressively amalgamated Europe 
earns more strength and magnitude in the global palestra.83 
    The Convention on jurisdiction and enforcement of judgements in civil and 
commercial matters (“Brussels Convention”)84 institutes a vital component on the 
constant strive of Europe’s integration. The staple purpose of the Convention is that 
the signatory-states are deemed as a one and unified judicial order: discrimination and 
disbelief towards an alien court are contradictory to and out of the “psyche” of the 
Convention. The judgements of a member state’s court are truly enforceable in the 
other member states with a very restricted adjectival review.85 The Brussels I Recast86 
supersedes the Brussels I Regulation 44/200187, which successively superseded the 
Brussels Convention.   
  
 
i) The “Vetoing” of Anti-suit injunctions via the EU jurisprudence 
    If anti-suit injunctions are a successful procedural utensil employed to strengthen 
jurisdiction agreements and block parallel procedures, then why are they undesirable? 
Why does the ECJ ban their usage? It is advisable to exhibit the reason of their 
                                                          
83 Maura E. Wilson, “Let Go of that Case - British Anti-Suit Injunctions against Brussels Convention 
Members”, 36 Cornell Int'l L.J. 207 (2003), pp.207-208 
 
84 1968 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
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prohibition via the semantic jurisprudence in the EU sphere, before we move to assess 
whether they might be admissible at all costs, under the up-to-date Brussels I Recast.  
    The seminal case that the ECJ condemned the usage of anti-suit injunctions was 
Turner v. Grovit88. Mr. Turner brought actions in London to obstruct the defendants 
from persisting the proceedings in Spain, with the justification that they were 
challenged in “bad faith”. Then, he referred to the Court of Appeal and the latter, in 
its turn, issued an anti-injunction, supporting that the real cause of the suit 
commenced by the defendants was to menace and exercise compulsion on Mr. 
Turner. Hence, the defendants made an appeal to the House of Lords, who pushed 
the topic to the ECJ to decide. The ensuing ECJ’s denotation was that even when a 
party is conducting in an unconscionable manner by inserting a case in a foreign 
jurisdiction to thwart the ongoing procedure, a court cannot grant an anti-suit 
injunction to stunt the recalcitrant party from retaining the litigation in the foreign 
court. The government of UK contested that anti-suit injunctions were not addressed 
against the foreign court but against the party individually, though the ECJ was 
negative again, since a sanction restricting the party from attending an action towards 
a foreign court automatically leads to the deprivation of its control upon jurisdiction 
to adjudicate the case. The decision of the ECJ was utterly counted on the doctrine of 
“mutual trust”, which in the sphere of EU is translated into a silent duty nominating 
each member state to defer the authority of the other’s legal regimes, to operate 
individually, but in a concrete and harmonious way to achieve the aim of the EU’ s 
integration.89 Thus, the ECJ in Turner case consulted that the issuance of anti-suit 
injunctions by a court of a member state prohibiting a party from initiating or 
persisting on procedures before a foreign court of another member state is 
inadmissible with the Regulation and this remedy is totally banned in the territory of 
the EU. 
    But what about anti-suit injunctions to safeguard arbitration more than litigation? 
Someone can consider that the explicit exclusion of arbitration under the Article 
1(2)(d) of the Brussels I Regulation should assume that the latter does not furnish any 
power to impede an injunction aiming at defending arbitration. Nevertheless, in West 
Tankers case90 the ECJ underpinned that an anti-suit injunction in favor of arbitration 
was not reconcilable with the Regulation.91 
    The case initiated after a clash involving a vessel chartered by West Tankers and Erg 
Petroli Spa (Erg) in Italy. Erg started arbitration procedures against West Tankers, 
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abiding their charter party agreement, in London. Then, West Tankers reacted to this 
action, and sought for an anti-suit injunction at the English High Court, disputing that 
the conflict was emerged from the charter party being relied on London arbitration 
provision. The High Court issued the injunction but on the appeal the House of Lords 
had some second-thoughts and brought the case before the ECJ. The crux in this 
instance was, whether is compatible to the Brussels regime for a member state’s 
court, to prohibit a party from commencing procedures in another state’s court, on 
the basis that are in violation of an arbitration agreement. In its judgement the ECJ 
exhibited three justifications for contending that, regardless the arbitration exclusion, 
anti-suit injunctions were not accepted by the Regulation. As its first ratio92 cited that, 
when the subject of the dispute is evidently within the context of the Regulation, then 
the validity of the arbitration agreement is erected into a preliminary matter which 
fell into the competence of the Italian Court. The ECJ determined that the subject 
matter of the actions in Italy was for tort damages, being a crucial evaluation to 
determine its protection under its “veil”, and it was not at the authority of the English 
court to issue an anti-suit injunction and impede the Italians to practice their 
imperium.93 Secondly94, the ECJ declared that a state’s court does not have the right 
to challenge a total removal of another state’s court to rule upon its jurisdiction by 
enjoining a party to secede the process in that court. Following this pace would also 
injure deeply the “effet utile” on which Judgements Regulation is rooted. As its last 
inference95, the ECJ held that the corollaries of an anti-suit injunction would be au 
fond unfair, because the compelled litigant would be obstructed from its admission to 
the national court, being dispossessed by its salient right to be protected by the 
justice. The court also recommended that its judgement was completely in line with 
the NYC, but the problem in this allegation is that the latter does not meditate on 
questions of timing or precedency.96  
    After this judgement, a sizeable dissension emerged from the arbitration society 
with certain arguments being well-founded, declaring that the deficiency of lucidity in 
certain facets of West Tankers decision and the clouded landscape of the interface 
among arbitration and litigation on the EU, had led to an ardent debate. The 
judgement of West tankers revived concerns about the problem of “torpedo 
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actions”97, parties were attempting to manipulate Brussels Regulation by freezing 
lawsuits. The principle of “mutual trust” was upheld may times by case-law, even in 
the case of an unconscious torpedo, forcing English courts to refuse their jurisdiction. 
Some are frightened that West tankers can be evolved into a hazardous pace 
authorizing a behavior towards a proliferation of more “torpedo actions”, instead of 
pursuing the harmonization of European courts, as the doctrine demands. Despite 
that, this “doomsday” scenario, was overall characterized as an excessive reaction and 
unnecessarily inflamed recent economic grief. The sentence created also doubts even 
on the efficacy of the ECJ as a well-rationalized “catalyst of justice”. Professor 
Jonathan Harris opined that: “It is difficult to conceive of a more thinly reasoned or 
incomplete judgment It fails sufficiently to examine the central question as to the 
meaning and scope of the arbitration exclusion. In this respect, the question arises as 
to whether the validity of the arbitration clause can be so easily dismissed as a 
preliminary issue in foreign litigation that does not alter the civil and commercial 
character of those foreign proceedings”.98  
    Skepticism and criticism are a vital element of ameliorating the judicial system, but 
not when they are transformed into a jitter. Better than carrying on this road of ego-
disaster, it is the time for the commanders of the EU arbitration to be activated and 
find pragmatic solutions. Vannevar Blush’s, a famous U.S. engineer, pronouncement 
in the field of engineering, fits perfectly on this tremble concerning the West tankers 
case: “Fear cannot be banished, but it can be calm and without panic; it can be 
mitigated by reason and evaluation”.99 So, a “newborn” expectancy had to be 
revealed, being the sole path to exemplify the situation. 
 
 
ii) Preparedness for the Brussels Recast: Seeking a “newborn” expectancy 
    The time the West Tankers judgement in February of 2009 issued, recommendations 
had being spread, concerning the potent rectification of the Regulation. The 
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Regulation itself demanded in its Article 73 that in five years the latest after its 
entrance (2001), the Commission should make a report on its reverberations. 
Somehow overdue, on 21st of April 2009, the commission introduced a report and a 
green paper, pressing in the first-line urgency the “interaction among the regulation 
and the arbitration”100. In order to resolve the barrier of parallel proceedings, the 
Commission suggested to erase the preclusion for arbitration, completely or to a 
limited extent, because it would ameliorate the interaction with the court procedure. 
Thus, court collateral procedures benefiting arbitral process, could be included in the 
scope of Regulation’s application. This report was founded on numerous researches, 
but it provided material magnitude on the study of the Heidelberg report of 2007101.102  
    On 14 December of 2010 the Commission’s Proposal103 tendered a “conciliation”: 
the arbitration preclusion would continue to subsist under the Regulation, but with a 
slight deviation (Article 29(4)104). The competent court for jurisdictional matters would 
be the member state’s court agreed as the situs of the arbitration or the arbitral 
tribunal, once were conducted the procedures. When a court process or an arbitration 
was initiated in the seat, the foreign Member State’s court whose competence is 
provoked, grounded on the arbitration agreement, should immediately stay its 
process. Furthermore, once the validity or enforcement of the arbitration agreement 
is canonized in the seat, the alien court should refuse jurisdiction. This type of ruling 
was resembled to the so-called lis pendens principle.105 This norm substantially gears 
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a self-activating anti-suit injunction, without labelling it anti-suit injunction106. By 
holding on the parties’ selection of the locus as the competent jurisdiction to 
determine the validity of the arbitration agreement, it equips a fair-minded solution 
to discourage the breaching parties to the torpedo harassment, because the latter 
action would plainly be ceased. The Commission’s Proposal was perceived by many as 
a positive progress, founding proponents, like the International Bar Association (“IBA”) 
and peers as a headway over the ECJ’s construction on the forbiddance of anti-suit 
injunction under the Regulation. This is precisely the concept which has already be 
promoted by the U.S. of “primary” and “secondary” jurisdiction.107  
    However, there were others, who contradicted to this solution, denoting that any 
mention to arbitration would give the bargain to a court to govern arbitration-related 
affairs, pointing what was materialized by the ECJ in the West Tankers case. Indeed, 
Rapporteur of the European Parliament Tadeusz Zwiefka published a report108, where 
sturdily opposed to the dilution of the preclusion of arbitration from the Brussels 
Regulation, even the limited one and commented that the West Tankers decision 
should be “binned”. The Council of the EU patronized its view on the exclusion of 
arbitration, with the Parliament as its “synergy”, abandoning the endorsements of the 
European Commission.109 
 
 
iii) Recital 12: Delineation on the construction of arbitration exclusion - A felicitous 
elucidation? 
    Article 1(2)(d) of the Brussels I Recast explicitly precludes the arbitration from its 
“veil” of protection, like its antecedent, but the distinguishing element accommodated 
on the Recast is the direction that provides on the construction of the arbitration 
preclusion. In its Recital 12, there exist four paragraphs, which directly outface the 
arbitration exclusion. It is peremptory to evaluate, whether any of its paragraphs runs 
counter to the anterior jurisprudence of the ECJ, aborting the use of anti-suit 
injunctions. 
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    The first paragraph of Recital 12 declares that a court’s judgement concerning an 
arbitration agreement will not be included in the jurisdictional scope of the Recast. 
This phrase is perfectly complying with Article II(3) of the NYC. So, when a court first 
directed an issue where an arbitration agreement has been claimed, this does not 
force the second court to anticipate its judgement on jurisdiction; actions in both 
courts can performed concurrently. The meaning of this paragraph is that courts are 
liberate to perform their national legislation to decide upon the validity of an 
arbitration agreement before sending the parties to the competent arbitral 
tribunal.110 In this meaning there is not a sign accepting the admissibility of anti-suit 
injunctions. 
    The second paragraph stipulates that a decision on the existence and validity of an 
arbitration agreement should not rely on the rules of recognition and enforcement of 
the Recast, even in the guise of an incidental’s interrogation, connected with the 
substance of the dispute in the context of the Recast. This concession purports that in 
a hypothesis like Endesa111, the English courts would not be engaged by the Spanish 
court’s judgement and could render its decision autonomously, ruling on the validity 
of the arbitration agreement. This situation features a dangerous contraption for 
manipulating strategies, which would definitely result to parallel proceedings and 
conflicting decisions.112  
    This paragraph was the more controversial one, as many attempted off-beat to 
interpret it. First Evrigenis and Kerameus in their report contended that “the 
veriﬁcation, as an incidental question, of the validity of an arbitration agreement 
which is cited by a litigant to contest the jurisdiction of the court before which he is 
being sued pursuant to the Brussels Convention, must be considered as falling within 
its scope113”, being the opposite meaning of the second paragraph which expressly 
elucidates this matter. It was also falsely supported that the second paragraph 
inverted the West Tankers judgment. Advocate General Wathelet was the one, who 
contended on the Gazprom case, that the Recast permits the granting of anti-suit 
injunctions in favor of the arbitration process, since a decision on the existence and 
validity of an arbitration agreement is excluded from its scope. He also presumed that 
if the case of West Tankers was governed under the Recast, the anti-suit injunction 
composing the subject matter of the decision, would not have been viewed as 
                                                          
110 Supra n.25, p.277 
 
111 Navigation Co. v. Endesa Generacion SA, [2009] EWCA (Civ) 1397 (Comm.), para.39 
 
112 Supra n.91, pp.20-21 
 
113 Evrigenis and Kerameus Report on the Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments 
in civil and commercial matters, ([1986] OJ C298/1), para.35 
 
27 
 
inadmissible114. However, this justification is not plausible enough115. In addition, if 
someone observes carefully the paragraph 27116 of the West Tankers judgement, it is 
argued that this status has, now, been altered by the second paragraph, concluding 
that decisions on the existence and validity of arbitration agreements are not 
perceptible according to the Recast. But then a counterargument can be similarly 
placed that, albeit procedures on the arbitration agreements are out of the width of 
Recast, they might have onerous repercussions on the efficacy of the instrument, 
obstructing the confederation of the jurisdictional rules in civil and commercial 
matters. West tankers was not overturned throughout the Recast117 with the EU being 
afraid by the effect of letting the whole administration of arbitration to be controlled 
by the national laws of Member States, and as an aftermath, the chronometer would 
be adjusted back again before the judgement, permitting member states to grant anti-
suit injunctions in favor of arbitration process.118 Hence, the second paragraph does 
not enunciate the admissibility of the anti-suit injunctions, but it plainly exemplifies 
that a decision on the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement is not liable 
on the rules of recognition and enforcement of the Recast, and courts are no more 
demanded to recognize another’s court judgement regarding the arbitration 
agreement, inverting in this effect the Endesa case. 
    The third paragraph refers to the decision of the court upon the substance of the 
dispute being included in the scope of the Recast, though the decision of the same 
court upon the existence and validity of the arbitration agreements is not relied on 
the recognition and enforcement rules of the latter. In this paragraph is, additionally, 
stipulated the priority of the NYC over the Recast, as it is repeated in Article 73(2)119. 
This provision views upon the recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award and 
a State’s decision on the substance of the dispute. But what would happen in the event 
where an anti-suit injunction is issued to restrain a party from initiating actions with 
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the goal to question the recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award? It is ad 
rem to recall that the project of the Recast does not encompass the recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards, it is the NYC’s “job” to perform120.121 Therefore, there 
is not an intimation in paragraph 3 that designates the permissibility of the anti-suit 
injunctions.  
    The fourth paragraph denotes that actions or ancillary procedures with respect to 
arbitration are barred by the Recast, such as the composition of the arbitral tribunal, 
the authority of the arbitrators, the administration of the process not even any 
decision regarding the appeal or enforcement of arbitral awards in a non-inclusive 
manner. There was a venture by many commentators that this provision “leaves the 
room” to be interpreted, as permitting the granting of anti-suit injunctions, since the 
latter in favor of arbitration forms ancillary actions to the arbitration.122 Advocate 
General Wathelet upheld this allegation and signified that such injunctions are well-
matched with the Recast, as ancillary actions protecting the bona fide conduct of the 
arbitral procedure. While the Recast was not applicable, he read it as holding a 
“retroactive interpretative import”.123 Even so, this rationalization on the admissibility 
of anti-suit injunction under the Recast is not prudent.  
    As for the anti-arbitration injunctions, they are audibly embraced by the arbitration 
exclusion in Article 1(2)(d) of the Brussels Regulation, not regulating their recognition 
and enforcement. It is figured from the ECJ’s judgement in West Tankers that the 
interdiction does not apprehended, where the process in the Member States is an 
arbitral one. In simple landscape, anti-arbitration injunctions are not afflicted by West 
Tankers, inasmuch do not implicated in the jurisdiction’s nomination of a Member 
State’s court.124  
  
 
iv) Gazprom v. Lithuania case: the revivification of Anti-suit injunctions’ Storyline 
    One could consider that this long debate of the utilization of the anti-suit injunctions 
had been drained by the ECJ in the Turner and West Tankers cases, though a novel one 
revived this “fiery” subject in the field of international arbitration. The Gazprom 
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case125 shows the light path on whether the member states’ courts are binding to 
recognize and enforce or decline the recognition and enforcement of an “arbitral” 
anti-suit order, as until now, anti-suit injunctions have been forbidden by the ECJ in 
the European union’s judicial sphere.  
    In Gazprom case the dispute was arose from a shareholders’ agreement regarding 
the ownership and function of a gas provider, Lietuvos Dujos. The latter consists of 
three principal shareholders and all together with Gazprom and the Ministry of Energy 
of Lithuania comprises “E.ON Ruhrgas”. In the year of 2004, they concluded an 
arbitration according to the SCC Rules. A conflict emerged, and the Ministry of Energy 
started research procedures before the court of Lithuania. Whilst Gazprom initiated 
an SCC arbitration contested that the Lithuanian Ministry of Energy was acting in 
violation to the arbitration clause of the shareholders’ agreement. Despite the issue 
was not being determined yet by the Lithuanian court, the arbitral tribunal awarded 
an infringement of the Ministry of Energy concerning his demands at the Lithuanian 
court as being incompatible with the shareholders’ agreement, ordering their 
revocations. Then Gazprom attempt to recognize and enforce the award at the 
Lithuanian court of Appeal, but the latter denied on the basis that it was not 
enforceable, being contrary to the public policy of the country according to Article 
V(2)(b) of NYC126. The appeal brought to the Lithuanian Supreme court, which 
gestured a referral to the ECJ for interpretation. What was posed by the Lithuanian 
court was, whether the Regulation impedes national courts of member states from 
recognizing and enforcing an arbitral award, forbidding a party from raising particular 
claims before a State’s a court. The pivotal question was not the potential 
inadmissibility of anti-suit injunctions with the Regulation, but the inadmissibility of 
the recognition and enforcement of an arbitral anti-suit order127. The court responded 
with a separation between the recognition and enforcement of the SCC arbitral award 
and the Brussels regime, which regulates the jurisdiction over judgements in civil and 
commercial issues.128  
    Thus, the court decided that the arbitral anti-suit order does not contravene to the 
Brussels regime, the arbitral tribunals are not restricted by the doctrine of the “mutual 
trust”, and so the principal proceedings fall under the national and international law 
in force of the member state where recognition is pursued, and not by the Regulation. 
It seems that the ECJ concluded with a reasonable solution taming the principle of 
“mutual courtesy” merely in the intra-court jurisdiction according to the Judgements 
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Regulation, endorsing that arbitral tribunals are not “courts”129;130 they can issue anti-
suit orders, honoring the performance of the scheme. Seizing from an arbitration 
angle, the Gazprom judgement accommodates a “short” triumph for arbitration in its 
wise preclusion of the arbitral awards from the Brussels regime, ascending it in a 
higher posture in conjunction with the court-issued anti-suit injunctions vetoed under 
the West Tankers decision131. 
 
     
B. WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED SO FAR? HEARING THE HAGUE REACTIONS  
    It is anticipated how the ECJ will adjudicate after the adoption of the new 
Regulation. While the Recast is not prepared to find the appropriate equilibrium, the 
ECJ will have the final word, but even this is “ramshackle”, as the following suggest. 
Bell purports that “it is difficult to imagine that the European Court of Justice would 
be sympathetic to the use of a jurisdictional weapon such as the anti-suit injunction 
which has the potential to overpower the allocation of jurisdiction which the Brussels 
Convention enshrines”132. Hartley on the other hand claims that the ECJ’s ruling is 
unrealizable to prognosticate and court would unquestionably esteem the political 
destination of institutional accord as supreme: the ECJ has not be glaring for its ardor 
in safeguarding the rights of individual when they collide with the institutional 
concerns133.  
    Whilst the ECJ is dubious in finding a terminal solution on the contestable matter of 
anti-suit injunctions, at any moment the recommended “Hague convention on 
jurisdiction and foreign judgements in civil and commercial matters”, strives to cover 
the crack remained by the Brussels regime, containing the fiasco of the non-regulation 
of anti-suit injunctions. The writers of the convention have revealed that there would 
be a confined scope of action for anti-suit injunctions, preventing proceedings 
initiated in an alien forum merely to vitiate the contestant. It is evident that the 
discussions and deliberations would evolve into a strenuous and tough mission, 
however the outcome will reward the whole toil. The signatory-states would be 
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availed by the accepted rules concerning the anti-suit injunctions and be exonerated 
from a perpetual circle of non-qualified rules.134   
    The fight on the matter of anti-suit injunction in the European sphere flows from 
the disputation between common and civil law legal philosophies and their 
performance in its borders. The Brussels Regime seems to be grounded chiefly on civil 
law archetypes with the ECJ being in its most part a civilian court. This exact feature 
clarifies the standpoint of the Court to a great expanse. This separation is not a plain 
issue, in substance is a separation on priorities; the divergence on the conflict-of-laws 
area, directly influences the area of the jurisdictional procedure. It is evident from the 
interpretation of the rules that common law promotes pliability over certainty and the 
adequacy of the forum over predictability.135  
 
 
 
 
IV. ANTI-SUIT/ANTI-ARBITRATION INJUNCTIONS THROUGH A COMMON  AND A 
CIVIL LAW JURISDICTION 
 
A. ENGLISH COURTS INSIGHTS:  
i) Pivotal preconditions for acquiring an Anti-suit injunction 
    The authority of the English courts to issue interim measures, is expressly educed 
from Section 37(1) of the SCA of 1981, which proclaims that: “the High Court may by 
order (whether interlocutory or final) grant an injunction or appoint a receiver in all 
cases in which it appears to the court to be just and convenient to do so”. The 
concerted power to grant an anti-suit injunction was defined in the AES Ust-
kamenogorsk case136. Before this decision some English courts allowed anti-suit 
injunctions to be imposed as an interim device, justified in Section 44(3) of the EAA of 
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1996137, but then the Supreme Court came to subvert this footing, underpinning as 
the appropriate legal basis for the High court’s jurisdiction, the Section 37(1) of the 
SCA of 1981. As Lord Mance has denoted an anti-suit injunction is not for the purposes 
and in the interests of the arbitral procedure, but for the negative troth entailed in the 
arbitration agreement not to bear foreign procedures. Section 37 empowers the 
English courts to grant anti-suit injunctions even in the absence of a vindicated 
arbitration agreement, a datum that was reiterated also by the Commercial court in 
its decision in Southport Success S.A. case138.139 
    The legal background which regulates the jurisdiction of the English courts is 
enshrined in two overlaid regimes: the domestic national law according to the Section 
37(1) jointed with the “common law” ruling of jurisdiction on the performance of 
proceedings, and the European law jurisdictional orders addressed by the Brussels 
regime. Exerting from the cloak of protection of Brussels regime, the performance for 
the issuing of injunctions prohibiting a party from bringing actions in a foreign court 
have been disputed in multiple cases in front of the Court of Appeal, the House of 
Lords and the Privy Council. The final judgments on these cases, as was in Tonicstar140, 
were concluded that an anti-suit injunction, is a jurisdictional remedy with a sound 
discretionary character, being issued merely when the court finds it as suitable to do 
it, according to all the facts of the case, and when the “ends of justice” demand such 
a drastic measure. The court will appraise both inequities of the claimant and the 
defendant, before deciding to address an injunction.141 Other additional discretionary 
strands in the English courts judgment, can embrace the peril of depriving security 
acquired in a foreign court procedure and the danger of inequity procured by 
unsuitable judgements implicating a third party142. 
    In UK there are two classes of injunctions: a) the “breach of contract” injunctions, 
where foreign procedures are in violation by a contractual forum clause chosen by the 
parties, assigning the English courts the sole jurisdiction or for arbitration to deal with 
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dispute in England and Wales, and b) “alternative forum” cases, where foreign 
procedures duplicate with issues that are deemed to be adjudicated in English courts 
and are additionally “vexatious and oppressive or unconscionable”. The first category 
of injunctions includes cases referring to an arbitration clause binding the parties to 
resolve their dispute at a selected arbitral tribunal. Normally, English courts will try to 
enforce a valid arbitration clause, operating in such a way craving to reserve the 
parties’ volition upon the selection of the forum. In these circumstances, it is adequate 
for the English courts to prove that a party was behaved in a manner provoking an 
infringement of contract by initiating the foreign procedures, exerting from the need 
to demonstrate the “vexatious and oppressive or unconscionable” conduct, but merely 
in the case of a non-exclusive jurisdictional agreement.143 
    The doctrines dominating anti-suit injunction issued by the English courts are 
enshrined in the Angelic Grace case. The exercise of the jurisdiction is certainly 
optional but influential, and forceful justifications requires to be proved why it should 
not be exercised in a specific case. Corresponding to the English courts, the subjacent 
logic is the enforcement of a contractual engagement: an anti-suit injunction is 
granted on the footing that the defendant pledged not to bring them.144 In this 
perception the deliberation of comity and veneration to the courts of an alien state 
do not impede the issuance of an injunction and as was inscribed in the OT Africa Line 
judgement “the true role of comity is to ensure that the parties’ agreement is 
respected”145, coming “right in the eyes” with the civil law archetypes. 
    An additional threshold for the effectiveness of a petition for an anti-suit injunction 
is that it should be readily committed and before the foreign process is too far 
progressed, as Millet L.J. has emphasized. It is denoted in Transfield Shipping Inc. 
case146, that the “delay” and the “phase” of the alien proceedings should counted as 
interrelated and not two separated preconditions on the admissibility test of the 
injunction, being the jarring on the Essar Shipping Ltd147 case presented the 
accumulative nature of these two components.148 
    But all the above are uncertain and brought “on the edge of the abyss”, attending 
the momentous “Leave” voting of the referendum in 23 June of 2016. 
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 ii) Brexit: the “Present” and the “Future” for Anti-suit injunctions 
    The initial step for the inquiry of the eventual incident of Brexit on the present legal 
regime is founded in Article 50 of the TFEU. This is the article that prescribes the legal 
corollaries of the secession outside the EU. When Article 50 is enacted the UK will 
attain a two-year period to discuss upon the terms of a secession agreement. 
Afterwards, when the consultation era lapses, neither of the European union’s 
institutional concordats will continue to apply to the UK. This outcome would 
immediately retract Article 288 of TFEU149, which furnishes the straight appliance and 
engaged virtue of the EU Regulations, involving also the Recast Regulation, leading to 
its ablation from the English legal regime.150    
    It is a strenuous process to evaluate the repercussions that the Brexit would have 
on anti-suit injunctions granted by the English courts in favor of arbitration procedures 
with the situs in London and the reputedly actions brought in a Member state’s court. 
It is fully dependent on the conditions that the UK is capable to discuss for its “Leave” 
from the EU. If the UK decides not to continue to abide the Brussels regime, Brexit 
would generate a legal gap resulting to an immediate and essential replacement with 
an alternative option with the EU, if it desires to keep being availed from the reciprocal 
recognition and enforcement of judgements. The contingent choices that UK might 
possess for the jurisdictional matters, will directly affect the application of anti-suit 
injunctions and be displayed in a synopsis as follows.151  
    Initially, the UK could assent with the EU, to a regime like the Denmark’s model, 
according to which UK would be subscribed to the Brussels I Recast in the same way 
as Denmark did in 2005. In the context of this adoption, the rules of the Recast, 
encompassing its Recital 12, would remain untouched and applicable. Even though 
ECJ has declined to adhere the AG Wathelet’s interpretation in the Gazprom case, it is 
not yet precluded a possibility of withdrawal by its recent consideration, welcoming 
the Advocate’s General fervid support that anti-suit injunctions in favor of arbitration 
would be dislodged by the Brussels regime.152          
    Furthermore, a second choice could be the agreement on the “Lugano” pattern. The 
Lugano Convention153 is in effect among the EU member states and the Iceland, 
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Switzerland and Norway. With its depart from the EU, the UK would demand to enter 
to the Lugano Convention, after crossing the total acceptance of all contracting states. 
This Convention is not synchronized with the Brussels Recast and does not 
accommodate, naturally, its Recital 12. According to this deliberation it is in doubt 
whether the English courts would adhere the ECJ’s judgements after the Brexit. But it 
is not also debarred that the English courts would construe and apply the Lugano 
Convention in a progressive way, considering the adjustments done of the Recast to 
endorse the injunctions in favor of arbitration. There is also an implication spotted in 
this insertion: the “torpedo” actions would reappear since the Lugano Convention has 
not been reformed to deal with these actions dissimilar to the Brussels regime.154  
    A third choice can be made by certain discussions between the deputies to create 
and ratify a novel treaty on the recognition and enforcement of judgements, which 
would order or not limitations on the authority of the English courts to grant anti-suit 
injunctions. But in order to avoid the protracted treaty-penmanship practice, a 
plausible lane is to launch an already submitted treaty status. The dominant nominee 
is the Hague Convention on Choice of court agreements (“Hague convention”), which 
was came into force in the UK on 1 October of 2015155. Even so, there would appear 
substantial prospective pitfall for the UK in selecting this Convention instead of an EU 
or EFTA formed settlement. The Hague Convention is characterized by a more 
restricted substantive sphere of protection, ruling merely the exclusive jurisdiction 
agreements. Provisional measures are ostracized by its circuit and its recognition and 
enforcement regime contains the arduous bylaw of “exequatur”. Hence, it is obvious 
that it does not institute a concise way-out, but it might be employed as a functional 
provisional device in the desideratum to shield the rectitude of the exclusive 
jurisdiction agreements benefiting the English courts. It is also propagated, as it is 
mentioned, that a new Hague Convention is being constituted under the aegis of the 
Hague Conference on Private International Law, as a section of its “Judgements 
Project”. Albeit this planning is a significant one, the UK will not have the bargain to 
exploit it for some time.156 
    The last choice from the “basket” for the UK, is to not access to any agreement 
regarding the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgements with the EU. The 
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selection of this road would inevitably conclude on the ex ante legal regime for the 
process in foreign non-EU courts in violation of the arbitration agreement, 
implementing the English law principles. Hypothesizing that Brexit comes with a total 
abrogation from the EU, containing all its laws, English adjudicators would not be 
demanded to obey the judgements provided by the ECJ, restraining their capacity to 
grant anti-suit injunctions in relation of court procedure in a court of an EU member 
state. This kind of restoration of the English courts’ authority to grant the injunctions 
could easily be assessed as giving back to London its “luster” as an antagonistic venue 
on the vigorous rivalry of the arbitration arena among prominent seats in the EU like 
Paris, Vienna and Stockholm, but also in a global extent;157 as Professor Janet Walker 
have signified with the blooming of locations such Singapore and Dubai the datum 
that their courts can issue anti-injunctions restraining parallel procedures by the 
parties of the arbitration agreement lessens London’s antagonistic whip hand158. This 
total removal from the EU would also score to the inapplicability of the “torpedo 
tactics”, except the event that UK would access the Lugano Convention. Therefore, 
the English courts would not be compelled, as they practice now, on the axioms of the 
Brussels regime, to postpone the process until the court of a member state, which 
seized first, decides on its own jurisdiction.  
    As it is clearly perceived, the place as to which instrument is probable to substitute 
the Recast Regulation in a post-Brexit legal scenery is equivocal. Each choice acquires 
certain drawbacks: legal, political and empirical. But for the sake of commercial 
certitude and of the persisting implementation of updated rules, it is prudent for the 
UK to be relied on the three piles of the Recast Regulation, the Lugano Convention and 
the Hague Convention.159 Espousing these three instruments “as fast as one’s legs can 
carry” after its abrogation from the EU would definitely safeguard its standing, as a 
dominant jurisdiction for the dispute settlement in trade and commerce. 
    During this legal upheaval, some mercantile parties engaging in long term dealings 
are opting for a “Brexit-proof” dispute settlement agreements: they mold a 
“conditional dispute resolution clause”. In this clause the parties could consent to 
supply English courts with jurisdiction, save and until, UK departs from the EU or either 
of the parties is no more habituated in an EU state where disputes will be settled in a 
London arbitration. Otherwise, the clause might furnish jurisdiction to a different 
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court, where the enforcement of a judgement rendered by the initial selection of court 
might be mobbed by a variation on the EU fellowship.160 
 
 
iii) Pivotal preconditions for acquiring an Anti-arbitration injunction 
    English courts have the general authority to issue anti-suit injunctions with the 
selfsame legal basis practiced to the issuance of the second type of the research, the 
anti-arbitration injunctions. In harmony with the EAA of 1996, a party who has not 
participated in the arbitral process, encompassing its action in the composition of the 
competent arbitral tribunal, may despite that occasion bring a contention to the 
courts that the arbitral tribunal lacked jurisdiction. This demand may be satisfied with 
an injunction impeding the performance of the arbitral procedure. This specific 
potential to request such an injunction is provided merely to a party who has not 
joined in the arbitration. Nevertheless, in Welex AG case, the Court of Appeal took the 
stance that on the ground of Section 37(1) of the SCA of 1981 for England and Wales, 
the High Court has the wide power to issue anti-suit injunctions in all the affairs deems 
to be “fair” and “appropriate” to do so. The case refers to an appeal brought against 
the High Court’s judgement to issue an anti-suit injunction hindering Welex from 
continuing court procedure in Poland, invoked in contravention to an arbitration 
agreement. The Court of Appeal opined that even if the authority to issue an anti-
arbitration injunction is not explicitly catered under the EAA of 1996, such authority 
can be generated on its intrinsic command fortified in Section 37(1) of the SCA of 
1981161.162 
    Espousing the Court of Appeal’s attitude, the English courts’ control to address anti-
arbitration injunctions should be used scarcely. As a matter of fact, the English courts 
present a stern standpoint concerning the injunctions attempting to impeach the 
arbitral process. They exercise this remedy in unique occasions, where it is apparent 
that the arbitration procedure has been falsely conducted. There was a case in which 
the Court of Appeal ruled that anti-arbitration injunctions should not be issued in the 
sole ground that the equilibrium of convenience turns in favoring the injunction. As 
Sellers LJ signified the tenets for issuing such injunctions are twofold that: a) they 
should not challenge the inequity to the claimant in the arbitration and b) the 
petitioner for a stay should prove the vexation of the subsequent performance of the 
arbitral process or the malversation of the procedure on behalf of the court. In its final 
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adjudication the Court of Appeal concluded that these premises were not qualified 
and declined the issuance of the anti-arbitration injunction.163 
    But these injunctions “shenanigans” are far from merely a legal implication, they 
are poured in the British’s “persona”.  
 
 
B. A CAPTURE AT THE BRITISH’S “PERSONA” 
    Some descant that the UK merely fabricates redundant intricacies with its anti-suit 
“egoistic paternalism164” and must convinced to befit authentically in the EU’s pact or 
not. The British nonetheless appear very gratified in sustaining their unwelcomed 
attitude by persisting to execute anti-suit injunctions. Professedly, it is a labored task 
to fully exile anti-suit injunctions from a legal ethos habituated to them. The capital 
hitch is that Britain does not have to play a “fair game” if it does not crave to do so. It 
feels uncertain about the vision of a joined Europe and it endure to its stance to cross 
the bar that the geography, its chronicles and the force of the political potential 
concedes to them. Whilst the road to the advance of European completion appears 
unavoidable, many nationals retain their status as “Eurosceptics” and UK’s perpetual 
employment of anti-suit injunctions against Convention signatories institutes an 
instant revelation of that cynicism. Still regardless of the British ambiguity and even 
enmity for the further completion with Europe, Britain de facto bestowed a substantial 
degree of its nationhood to the EU and of their common law canons to the Brussels 
regime. Hence, the conservation of the orders can be observed as a properly 
modulated legal equilibrium between the prerequisites of European completion and 
national sovereignty. The deal of the injunctions by Britain does not menace the 
Brussels regime in total, but it accouters a channel for the British to exhibit their sui 
generis values.165 
    The bestowal of these common law “values”, is further enmeshed by the fact that 
in civil law countries these orders are, as a rule, not disposable and groundless in their 
legal systems. In fact, this type of common law injunctions is “clashing” to their legal 
regime, being “from another legal cosmos166”. The innate court imperium in 
addressing injunctions does not inhabit in the civil law scene, depressing this kind of 
discretion and cursive revamping that common law occupies167.  
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C. GREEK COURTS INSIGHTS:  
i) Contesting Interim measures and Arbitration clauses  
    With the ratification of Law 2735/2009 (“LICA”), Greece was equipped with a novel 
contrivance for international commercial arbitration. In reality, this enactment was in 
line with the adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law, remodeling Greece in the shape 
of a “Model Law country”. By this gesture, Greece was not merely accessed the 
relevant group of Model Law states, but it also consented on a dichotomy of the Greek 
law between international and domestic commercial arbitration, with the latter 
confined in Articles 867-903 of GCCP. Until the 18 August 1999, Greece did not deposit 
any distinct legal regime on international commercial arbitration, although there were 
certain provisions applied in this regard, but they did not acquire any inner 
consistency. Adhering the lex fori doctrine of its civil process, the novel enactment 
“volens nolens” accepted the requirement of a dualistic system ruling on arbitration 
under the auspices of the Greek law. Nonetheless, the new modifications of 2006 have 
not so far been embodied into the greek statute.168 
    In the greek judicial awareness, punctuating that an arbitration agreement is a 
fortiori consented in the view of debarring the jurisdiction of domestic courts for the 
sake of a private jurisdictional mechanism (Article 3(1) of GCCP), the Piraeus court of 
Appeal have signified that “the jurisdiction of the civil courts (national and 
international) is abolished when the parties have included in the contract an 
agreement to submit to arbitration the disputes which may arise from the agreement 
(arbitration clause)” in their judgement 77/1985169. According to the greek principle, 
an arbitration clause is a completely separated contractual agreement between the 
parties, veiled with a procedural carver, evaluated not according to the Rome 
Convention of 1980, but Article 25 of the GCC, reporting that the contractual duties 
“…shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties. Failing this, shall be applicable 
the law which considering all relevant special circumstances is appropriate with regard 
to the contract”170. The legal classification of the arbitration agreement as a 
procedural agreement does not preclude the application of substantive law provisions 
on the configuration of the substance nor converts its nature, diverting it into a “mixed 
or sui generis” contract171.  
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    However, the Greek courts have the authority to assess the pleas on the validity of 
the arbitration agreement. In domestic arbitration, under the words of Article 685 of 
the GCCP, an arbitration agreement is not valid in cases covering interim (provisional) 
measures, and in partnership with Article 889 of the GCCP, the court is the sole 
adjudicator in this regard; the arbitral tribunal is not authorized to rectify these 
remedies. In international commercial arbitration this ruling alters with Article 17 of 
LICA172 expressly identifying the arbitrators’ command to grant interim measures after 
a party’s application. Albeit this gesture, the courts preserve their jurisdiction to grant 
provisional relief regarding the subject-matter of the arbitration ex ante or in the 
course of the arbitral process, building a coeval jurisdiction among courts and arbitral 
tribunals, prescribed in Article 9 of LICA173. However, the ascendancy of the civil 
court’s above the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction is counted on the firm greek inner 
jurisprudence afforded that the arbitral tribunal does not have the power to rectify a 
measure issued by a civil court, and further accruing to the inadmissibility of a protest, 
on the absence of the court’s jurisdiction included in the arbitration agreement. It is 
admitted that this mandate in greek reality is so sharp that it does not left any space 
for a different construction. Therefore, Greek courts, presuming that they possess 
international jurisdiction, may professedly grant provision measures, although there 
might subsists an arbitration agreement.174  
    Despite this valorization, the defendant has the concession to raise a declaration on 
the deficiency of Greek courts’ jurisdiction on the ground of a valid arbitration 
agreement, which should be implemented. Article 8(1) of LICA175, accompanied with 
Article 263 of the GCCP, declares that the said protest should be brought at the first 
hearing of the case. If the defendant deducts from succeeding this precondition, it is 
automatically created a “silent waiver” from the agreement to arbitrate, and 
eventually the court would avowedly contemplate that it has jurisdiction and 
determine upon the substance of the dispute.176 In a positive fulfilment of this 
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prerequisite, the Greek court will decline to attend the lawsuit and will resort the 
parties to arbitration, except it infers that the agreement is voidable (Article 264 of 
GCCP and Article 8(1) of LICA). However, the second paragraph of this article allows 
the arbitral process to proceed with a potential award, albeit the court action of 
paragraph 1 is pending.   
    It is pertinent to mention that the Greek courts’ baggage of dossiers is 
overburdened and each lawsuit with a commercial nuance is going to be heard after 
at minimum of eighteen months from the time of the first filing to the Secretariat of 
the competent court. It is apparent that throughout this period, with addition to the 
period until the decision will be issued, any arbitral procedures could not be advanced 
as a lis pendens method is ordinarily established. The Greek civil process is conducted 
in a sole hearing, where procedural and substantive topics are estimated. So, a 
manifest peremptory lawsuit cannot be adjudicated earlier from the timetable of the 
hearing and any dispute settlement per the arbitration mechanism would be stunted 
for a protracted time. It is unambiguous that these deliberations evidence the bargain 
furnished to either of the parties to move with a defiant strategy in order not to search 
for the real equity, but mainly to guide on the coercion for a resolution. There is an 
oration of an erudite greek Professor, which assembles to these situations challenged 
by recalcitrant parties, that: “the party who is wrong may hope, the party who is right 
must be concerned”.177 
 
ii) The semantic “Ordre public” for the Greek legal reality  
    It is contemplated that greek law, revering to the parties’ volition, employs as its 
head standard, the legal rather that the regional yardstick, to the applicability of a 
procedural law unhooked by the greek procedural “ordre public”, boosting the 
modern trend on the utter delocalization of the arbitral process178. But, under the 
framework of the procedural international law, the public policy operates differently, 
aiming to obstruct the validity of the foreign judgement when the latter combats with 
the greek public policy.  In this demand, the infinite scope of the public policy as a ratio 
of non-recognition should be reduced in a minimal scale (“effet attenue”), 
safeguarding the jurisdiction merely in its manipulation by a litigant turning in his 
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favor179, with the succor of the proportionality test, as Areios Pagos has signified180. 
The Greek courts have been confronted with cases of anti-suit injunctions and have 
downturned the possibility of their recognition with the justification of being contrary 
to the Greek public policy. The violated provisions are found in Article 33 of GCC and 
323 (5) of the GCCP, escorted with the constitutional and vital right of judicial 
protection (Article 20 Greek Constitution of 1975/1986/2001) and covers the 
“provisional judicial protection”181. The Greek courts endorse the jurisprudence of ECJ 
and especially the German’s theory in this regard (“Grundgesetz”182). 
    An illustrative exemplar of this confrontation presented when a greek and a german 
company, in the context of their business dealings, accessed into an arbitration 
agreement for arbitration in England. Notwithstanding the agreement, the Greek 
company commenced legal recourse in the year of 2006 against the German company 
before the First Instance court of Lamia in Greece, demanding the amount of circa 3 
million Euros on certain matters, included in the scope of the arbitration agreement. 
Then, the German company brought an action before the Commercial Court in 
London, invoking the granting of an anti-suit injunction in favor of the arbitration 
agreement. In July of the year 2009, the Commercial Court issued the injunction, 
commanding the Greek company to reimburse the German one to its legal 
expenses183. The German company brought an action for the recognition and 
enforcement of the final arbitral award and the anti-suit injunction in Greece. The First 
Instance court of Piraeus issued both petitions and this decision was appealed. The 
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182 “Anti-suit injunctions constitute an infringement of the jurisdiction of Germany, and thus the 
sovereignty of that state, because the German courts alone decide, in accordance with the procedural 
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183 in the amount of 33,000 in this process. In success, the Greek company resigned from its petition to 
the Greek courts formerly to the pre-hearing stage of the defenses’ submission by the parties. However, 
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Greek procedures. Searching to retrieve these expenses the German company started an arbitral 
process in England requiring these expenses as indemnity for the infringement of the arbitration 
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Greek company endured the recognition of the anti-suit injunction, building its 
argument on the ground of the EU Brussels Regulation by registering a discrete appeal 
according to Article 43 of the Brussels Regulation 44/2001184. The Admiralty Division 
of the Piraeus court of Appeal by enacting Article 34(1)185 upheld the appeal in its 
decision of 31/2012, opining that the anti-suit injunction should not be recognized as 
being “crushing” with the Greek public policy in which recognition is requested. The 
court justified its judgement contending that the enforcement of such a measure is 
evidently opposed to its state’s policy, because it contravenes both to the greek 
sovereignty by disrobing the “competence-competence” of its national courts and the 
right to resort to the courts for legal protection. In this judgement the court obedient 
to the previous greek jurisprudence on the idem matter, as was illustrated in the 
Piraeus court of Appeal decision of 110/2004186, contend that an anti-suit injunction 
is not congruent with Brussels regime, strengthened its ruling by citing the West 
Tankers judgement of the ECJ.187 
    Regarding the anti-arbitration injunctions, there is no legal basis or an intra-court 
report for their issuance in Greece. Article 16(1) of LICA188 sustains the “competence-
competence” doctrine for the arbitrators to rule on their own jurisdiction, denoting 
that if the arbitral process has already commenced, the greek courts must abstain 
from determining their jurisdiction, until the final award has been issued189.  
 
 
 
PRE-CONCLUSION - The “Symposium” of National courts and Arbitral tribunals 
    Responding to the bewilderment of whether national court interference threatens 
the performance of the arbitral procedure, it should be spelled that it is hinged on the 
tenor and conditions of the insertion. It is evident from the above analysis that national 
                                                          
184 Article 43(1) Brussels Regulation 44/2001, “The decision on the application for a declaration of 
enforceability may be appealed against by either party.” 
 
185 Article 34(1), “A judgment shall not be recognised: if such recognition is manifestly contrary to public 
policy in the Member State in which recognition is sought.” 
 
186 A, B v. C, D, Court of Appeal (Maritime Cases Section), 110/2004, [2004] PIRAIKI NOMOLOGIA 92 
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188 Article 16(1) LICA, “The arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including any objections 
with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. For that purpose, an arbitration 
clause which forms part of a contract shall be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms 
of the contract. A decision by the arbitral tribunal that the contract is null and void shall not entail ipso 
jure the invalidity of the arbitration clause.”   
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courts maneuver in varicolored legal and cultural backgrounds: there co-exist civil and 
common law jurisdictions induced with certain regional and political impacts. The 
viewpoint of each national court afforded to international commercial arbitration is 
inescapably painted with these magnets.190 
    The scheme of segregating completely arbitration from the European procedural 
legislature emerges to a forged depiction. With the denial of the EU Commission’s 
Proposal by its correspondents regarding the coeval court and arbitral procedures, I 
credit that the only denouement is erected in international contribution: a robust 
harmonization of arbitration laws within the EU palestra is demanded. Concomitantly, 
the EU has to achieve the proper equilibrium in shielding the sovereignty of its 
members to rule arbitration, while defending the party autonomy and the 
competence-competence doctrine, shaping the essence of international 
arbitration191. In order to find the solution, it is vital to search into the deep 
watercourse of notional comprehension.    
    Emmanuel Gaillard conceptualizes international commercial arbitration as an 
“autonomous” transnational order, validated by the state’s readiness to enforce the 
final awards of the arbitrators, while Jan Paulsson proposes the perception of 
international arbitration as a legal norm subsisted in a pluralistic universe of social 
orders. These orders would alternatively collaborate in a “horizontal” magnitude or 
distribute dominion in the context of the idem normative sector in a “vertical” 
magnitude; in due course this would guide to a sheathing of these orders creating a 
magnitude “of depth”192. While this conceiving of “social-legal” rules can elucidate the 
inmost operation, it is not lucrative enough to expose the outermost interplay 
between national courts and arbitral tribunals. Laboring on this task, the first solution 
is found in substituting the Paulsson’s definition of legal norm with one of the 
“normative agent”, connotating that each individual person, is an “agent”, with the 
ability to create or amend norms. Espousing this logic, the arbitrators and national 
courts can be depicted not acquiring any hierarchical scale between them. The second 
solution inhabits in the significance of the word “normative”, which permit the 
perception of standards other than those vented by the rules. In specific, this 
transition centers on the significance of principles in the arbitration arena, acquiring a 
more authoritative appearance of an utter right of contract legislation. All the 
“agents” will attribute a feeling of credibility serving their normative face and respect 
these principles. It is descried that the management of the interplay among the 
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192 Jan Paulsson, “Arbitration in Three Dimensions”, Society and Economy Working Papers 2/2010, 
London School of Economics and Political Science, Law Department (LSE Law), pp.1-34  
 
45 
 
normative agents is collected on the employment of these principles in the 
jurisdictional queries. The impeccable doctrine of “competence-competence” results 
to the anteriority to the arbitrators on jurisdictional matters among with those on the 
arbitration agreement, the principle that such accords must be construed widely 
observing the sterling volition of the parties. Within the context of this cohabitation 
on the dispensation of jurisdiction between national courts and arbitral tribunals, it 
peers that the two normative agents “stand on an equal footing”, adhering the 
conventional-akin principles. This interplay infused by a joint virtue has invited the 
“idea of arbitration”, aiding in the varying environment on international arbitration 
where new models would fateful come across.193 It is veritable that justice does not 
stagnate, and novel solutions have to be advanced to novel complications. 
 
 
CONCLUSION - Which conquers the “battle” 
    Civil law courts have generally declined granting or recognizing anti-suit injunctions 
to enforce the parties’ genuine accord to resolve their disputes under the shelter of 
arbitration. A recent evolution is interposed by the French Supreme court, upholding 
an anti-suit injunction addressed by a U.S. court to restrain the violation of a forum 
selection clause, attending to sight whether French courts will exercise the identical 
modus operandi over the anti-suit injunctions in support of arbitration194. A contrario, 
common law English courts have shored their legal philosophy on granting anti-suit 
injunctions in vigorously supporting a parties’ consented arbitration agreement. In the 
meantime, the ECJ’s sharp judgements “took the life” of the English legal ethos, 
embargoing anti-suit injunctions tete-a-tete with an EU adjudicator. Exerting the 
confines of the EU Brussels regime, English courts are not quailed in continuing their 
storyline in granting anti-suit injunctions in favor of an arbitration agreement, 
originated from their own legal history. “Arbitral” anti-suit orders in encroachment of 
an arbitration agreement are increasingly employed superseding the demolished 
intra-court ones, without catering a feasible surrogate, lacking on the enforcement 
phase and unavoidable interfacing with the EU statutes. 
    The identical stance is superposed by civil courts in the admittance of injunctions 
addressed in the arbitral process; civil law jurisdictions does not grant or recognize 
anti-arbitration injunctions. However, from the civil law genus, Brazil, Ethiopia and 
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Indonesia recently granted such injunctions195. For the English courts anti-arbitration 
injunctions are also tenable, but in a higher grade of caution in relation to anti-suit 
injunctions ex post an adequate weighting of coefficients. However, anti-arbitration 
orders are not yet afflicted by the ECJ’s jurisprudence. Thence, in a civil law country, 
like Greece, none of these injunctions “prevail”, while in a common law country, like 
UK, the evaluation scale sags at the wing of anti-suit injunctions in favor of arbitration, 
as the dominating ones. Regrettably, the grand bisection in international commercial 
arbitration is not a dichotomy of the legal cultures of common and civil law, it is 
between jurisdictions that befriend arbitration and those that are incredulous of 
arbitration196.  
    It is concluded that anti-suit and anti-arbitration injunctions are rather contestable 
and should be employed scarcely in a judicious way. Each choice demonstrates its own 
peril, as Odysseus had to float between Scylla and Charybdis. However, it appears to 
be an unanimity when such injunctions combat with opprobrious strategies targeted 
at counterfeiting the arbitral process, where arbitral and court procedure is audibly 
initiated with a provocative comportment. In choosing the most “proper” one, I turn 
my belief in the Jan Paulsson’s conception of a self-sufficient nature of international 
arbitration. The mining of an arbitration agreement id est a solemn hurdle; 
predestined to be adjudicated by a private, neutral and confidential forum, the party 
is entrapped in a cognizance filled with “corruption and xenophobia, everything is 
suddenly stacked in favor of the other side: language, procedure, practical 
convenience, ability to use one's own lawyers, cultural affinities with the 
decisionmaker … and the list goes on197”. So, anti-suit injunctions in the international 
commercial arbitration arena, can be advanced in a robust remedy as an invaluable 
attendant for arbitration agreements, if they are used in an evenhanded way.  
    To operate effectively, international commercial arbitration genuinely demands the 
“rule of law” and not the “rule by law”198. As Aristotle cited in the ancient Greece: “To 
be willing to go to arbitration rather than to a dikasterion; because the arbitrator looks 
to the equity but the dikast to the legal rule. It was for this reason that an arbitrator 
was chosen, so that equity should prevail199”. Altogether, judges, arbitrators and 
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counsels are betrothed in a joint practice to hold the role of justice “in their hands”, 
they are not combatants, they are allies for the vantage of the materfamilias Justice. 
A material grade of inter-pendency is absolutely indispensable and covetable in 
succeeding this practice to be waged effectively and economically in the forthcoming 
trade globalization. 
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